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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis will show that in Egyptian media and political discourse, women’s 
rights rhetoric serves as a façade for anti-woman nationalism, and in American media and 
political discourse, neoliberal support for the revolution cloaks gendered orientalism. 
Each is riddled with contradictions.  The juxtaposition of appropriating a pro-woman 
label while dismissing its substance, with the dismissal of a racist concept’s label yet 
utilization of its substance demonstrates a grave problem in both political activism and 
media: indifference to probing reflection and the prioritization of a means-to-an-end 
attitude.  This indifference and these priorities only produce short-term or surface-level 
solutions because they employ short-term and surface-level tactics.  Consequently, 
revolutions do not result in the desperately desired deconstruction of hegemonic political, 
economic and social systems, and media does not yield in-depth investigations into the 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The ongoing Egyptian Revolution remains a widely discussed situation in 
political, academic, and cultural environments. Gender is often a key factor in these 
discussions. Yet, when referenced, it is frequently couched in stereotypical tropes such as 
the vulnerable female and the violent male.  Rarely are these representations 
accompanied by comprehensive examinations of their complex histories and the social, 
political and economic systems at hand in both culture observed and culture observing. 
Rather, representations of masculinity and femininity are treated as useful tools that, 
when wielded effectively, can help influence the narrative of a revolution’s liminal state.  
As is the case in the Egyptian revolution, political actors mainly reference gender when 
doing so generates sympathetic or inflammatory narratives.   
There are few inquiries into the substantive role of gender in coverage of the 
revolution and in the revolution itself.  Notable exceptions to this include anthropologist 
Saba Mahmood, whose work focuses on secular and religious politics in postcolonial 
states; Sophia Azeb, an Egyptian-Palestinian feminist scholar of American and Ethnic 
Studies; and anthropologist Farha Ghannam, whose ethnography of gender in Egypt is a 
key text used in this introduction. Each of these three women’s work probes below the 
surface of both the revolution and its coverage.  Mainstream Western1 journalistic 
coverage of and commentary on the Egyptian revolution, and Egyptian political discourse 
and media do not.  In their failure to fully interrogate the role of gender in the revolution, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Throughout this paper I will use the terms “the West,” “Western,” and “Global North” interchangeably. 
These terms refer generally to North America – primarily the United States and Canada – and countries in 
Western Europe. Most of the “Western” sources I use, however, come from The United Kingdom and the 
United States.    
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these commentaries and discourses overlook gender as a subject yet employ gendered 
narratives in the hegemonic, orientalist, and colonized spaces – in this case Egypt and the 
revolutionary space – they occupy.  Gender is therefore in both the revolution’s 
foreground and background; it is disregarded yet simultaneously of great importance.  
I argue that it is important to understand how neoliberal Western support of the 
Egyptian revolution and internal Egyptian political discourse relate to each other with 
regard to their respective utilizations of gender, for each undermines the very movements 
they purport to support or represent through their respective gendered representations of 
Egypt. There are discrepancies between gendered or oriental discourses, and gender-
based or anti-racist political action.  Discourse, unsupported by action, is ideologically 
meaningless; discursive ideas prove nothing unless they are substantiated. However, 
discourse alone proves powerful in the public sphere, particularly when it shapes public 
opinion.  This thesis will evaluate the discrepancies in discourse and practice from both 
the West, and from within the revolution. 
One the one hand, the West supports the Egyptian revolution through a 
deployment of gendered orientalist imagery; Popular news sources such as The BBC, The 
New York Times, and The Washington Post published multiple articles and editorials ripe 
with incredulous praise of the revolution in its first months.2  These approval pieces 
carried with them the assumption that a democratic or non-authoritarian government is a 
Western product and should therefore be innately un-Arab or un-Egyptian.  This notion 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2 “BBC Democracy Live, 2011: Cameron Urges Transition to Democracy in Egypt ‘Now,’” BBC News, 
February 2, 2011. 
“Mr. Mubarak Is Put on Notice,” New York Times, January 26, 2011. 
“The U.S. Needs to Break with Mubarak Now,” Washington Post, January 29, 2011. 
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indicates that the revolution is impressive not because it fostered national unity, but 
because it demonstrates the desire of an Arab nation to transcend its inherent limitations. 
Finally, these pieces also present a highly generalized Arab or Muslim consciousness.3  
Additional pieces commented on the supposed looming threat of Islam, with one Wall 
Street Journal editorial branding the Muslim Brotherhood “anti-American.”4  As the 
revolution grew more violent and chaotic, media discourse suggested that the revolution 
was “bad for women,” 5 dichotomizing women’s rights in Egypt with American 
feminism.  Mainstream American media’s coverage of the revolution continues to use the 
United States – from government policies to social movements – as its point of reference. 
And despite its professed support for the revolution, the United States continues to 
engage in trade deals that perpetuate violence against civilian protestors. 
On the other hand, Egyptian political discourse deploys a rhetoric of women’s 
rights to define Egyptian nationalism on anti-feminist terms. Political figures express that 
they value female participation but do not back up their words with action. Both liberal 
and conservative parties consistently fail to implement comprehensive policy changes 
regarding gender.  These failures manifest in different ways.  Political bodies such as the 
Egyptian military, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Salafi party, have overtly impeded 
efforts to improve women’s lives.  Other bodies like the Egyptian Social Democratic 
Party and the Free Egyptians Party demonstrate their commitment to women’s rights by 
signing several lists of demands written by Egypt’s leading feminist organizations, yet 
refuse to engage in multi-party political talks that would allow them the influence and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Ashley Crowson, “Orientalist Representations of the 2011 Egyptian Revolution in Elite US Newspaper 
Editorials: A Critical Discourse Analysis” (PhD diss., Kings College London, 2013), 35.	  4	  “Egypt and the Realists,” The Wall Street Journal, February 2, 2011.	  5	  Isobel Coleman. “Is the Arab Spring Bad for Women?” Council on Foreign Relations, December 20, 
2011.	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platform needed to advance these demands. Gender may be widely mentioned, but policy 
is rarely built around it.  
Gender – particularly the treatment and symbolism of the female body – is a 
weapon of choice for many participants in the revolution. Civilian protestors, military 
personnel, and high-ranking political figures hurl accusations about sexual violence and 
gender inequality within the revolution at one another.  Many of these accusations are 
used to discredit the revolution or to denigrate political opposition.6 While these 
accusations claim to support women’s rights or respect the female body, they do not 
result in substantial political action on behalf of these rights.  There are multiple interests 
– some of which are contradictory – embedded in the political claims about women’s 
rights in Egypt.  Egyptian political figures utilize only the label of women’s rights for 
their own political gain but do not substantively advance the feminist values about which 
they purport to care.7 In many cases, they actively impede them.   
Foreign media coverage of and political commentary on the revolution from the 
United States and Europe have been similarly inconsistent.  News publications, bloggers, 
and television news correspondents or anchors employ gendered and racial tropes in their 
reports on the revolution.  Not only do critical reports and commentary on the revolution 
use these tropes, but sympathetic and supportive ones do as well. In this case, orientalist 
attitudes color the positions held by progressive politicians and news agencies that 
purport to support and respect the Egyptian revolution.  Moreover, orientalist tropes – 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  I am referring to political accusations and accusations made largely by people (mainly men) who are not 
victims of sexual assault. This is entirely different from the accusations made by women’s organizations or 
people who have been assaulted.  	  7	  This allusion to women’s rights for other political motivations is not restricted to Egypt. The United 
States continues to justify interference in international affairs by claiming that women are oppressed in a 
target country.  This was particularly the case in Afghanistan.  
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particularly when used in positive commentary – help justify neoliberal policies like 
economic-based international intervention.  This form of orientalism, which I term in this 
paper “neoliberal orientalism,” is often expressed without recognition or awareness by 
those doing so.  This lack of awareness is orientalism’s most dangerous quality: in its 
normativity, orientalism remains invisible to its perpetuators. I will unpack what I mean 
by “neoliberal orientalism” in the following section, Explanation of Terms. 
This thesis will show that in Egyptian media and political discourse, women’s 
rights rhetoric serves as a façade for anti-woman nationalism, and in American media and 
political discourse, neoliberal support for the revolution cloaks gendered orientalism. 
Each is riddled with contradictions.  The juxtaposition of appropriating a pro-woman 
label while dismissing its substance, with the dismissal of a racist concept’s label yet 
utilization of its substance demonstrates a grave problem in both political activism and 
media: indifference to probing reflection and the prioritization of a means-to-an-end 
attitude.  This indifference and these priorities only produce short-term or surface-level 
solutions because they employ short-term and surface-level tactics.  Consequently, 
revolutions do not result in the desperately desired deconstruction of hegemonic political, 
economic and social systems, and media does not yield in-depth investigations into the 
systemic problems in which the issues discussed are rooted.   
The following examples demonstrate this larger systemic problem: patriarchy is 
so deeply imbedded within the cultures discussed that it remains obscured.  The 
discourses examined are products of systems, of their environments, products of what is 
said and what is practiced.  I use the following individuals and parties to scrutinize 
systems of discourse, to analyze what is said versus what is done.  These individuals are 
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used as examples to reveal the indiscernible, to illustrate that not only do racism and 
sexism permeate even the most unexpected places, people, and movements, but also that 
they are socially, politically, and economically sanctioned.  
It is difficult to detect neoliberal orientalism and the effects of claims for 
women’s rights in politically, economically, and socially stable settings. I contend that in 
transitional moments or unstable settings, the media tend to express racist and sexist 
representations and attitudes with greater frequency.  Subsequently, they are more 
transparent. Egypt is in the midst of a revolution, and as I will demonstrate in the 
following pages, this revolutionary space is a liminal one that prompts the reinforcement 
of traditional gender roles.  The United States and Western Europe, while not socially 
stagnant, are not experiencing the same degree of social unrest and political upheaval as 
Egypt.  Therefore gendered and orientalist representations and attitudes are not as overtly 
emphasized; they remain undetectable in their casual normativity. 
  
Explanation of Terms 
1. Orientalism 
Orientalism is the process of Western identification of self in opposition to a 
distorted exoticized Other: ‘the Oriental.’  While the process of identity-through-othering 
is not restricted to the Middle East, North Africa, and Southeast Asia, these are the 
relational spaces addressed in most discussions of orientalism.8 Orientalism is different 
from anti-Black racism, different from anti-indigenous racism, for example.  There are 
specificities involved in each of these forms of racism.  One of orientalism’s specificities 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Edward W. Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage, 1979), xv - xxx. 
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is the feminization of the oriental (male) subject who, although ‘semi-savage,’ is exotic, 
delicate, and primitive. This feminization both belittles the subject and effectively 
equates femaleness with degradation, creating a schism between “oriental male” activism 
and women’s rights.  
Orientalist tropes are not restricted to Egypt, or to this specific revolution.  On the 
contrary, they have existed for centuries. In his central text, Orientalism, Edward Said 
explains: 
The difference between representations of the Orient before the last third 
of the eighteenth century and those after it (that is, those belonging to what 
I call modern Orientalism) is that range of representation expanded 
enormously in the later period.9    
 
With ever-expanding transnational contact and increased forms of media and news 
publication, the opportunities for representation, and the pervasiveness of popular 
representations have grown.  The same images of “Muslim men oppressing Muslim 
women” that Lila Abu-Lughod discusses in her essay “Do Muslim Women Really Need 
Saving? Anthropological Reflections on Cultural Relativism and its Others” are 
reproduced in a multitude of forms.10  These representations are not confined to literature, 
periodicals, and newspapers – they permeate both Western self-conceptions and policy.   
The West defines “the Orient” in opposition to itself, or rather, defines itself in opposition 
to an “Oriental Other.” “[T]he Orient,” Said writes, “has helped to define Europe (or the 
West) as its contrasting image, idea, personality, experience.” The West must actively 
reinforce orientalist images in order to sustain its self-identity.  Yet the Orient is not 
merely imaginative. “The Orient is an integral part of European material civilization and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Said, Orientalism, 22. 10	  Lila Abu-Lughod. "Do Muslim Women Really Need Saving? Anthropological Reflections on Cultural 
Relativism and Its Others." American Anthropologist 104, no.3 (2002): 783-90. 784.	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culture,” writes Said.11  When reproduced effectively over time, representations of “the 
Orient” begin to tangibly manifest, in popular culture images, “credible” academic works, 
and in even in their influence on U.S. foreign policy. In Orientalism, Said states, 
Representations have purposes, they are effective much of the time, they 
accomplish one or many tasks…The Orient as a representation in Europe 
is formed – or deformed – out of a more and more specific sensitivity 
towards a geographical region called “the East.”12 
Orientalism it seems is a self-fulfilling prophecy.   
 
2. Neoliberalism 
 According to American linguist and philosopher Noam Chomsky, the word 
“neoliberalism” literally implies “a system of principles that is both new and based on 
classical liberal ideas.”13 For Chomsky, one such classic liberal idea is the “exporting of 
American values.”14 The word was first used to critique globalization-type policies that 
kept Global South countries financially dependent on international conglomerates like the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.  The IMF and World Bank 
imposed structural adjustment policies on economically dependent countries.  These 
policies, promoted as poverty reducing programs, actually perpetuate the systemic 
problems responsible for poverty in the first place.  At its core, neoliberalism goes hand-
in-hand with capitalism; its focus is the generation of profit.  This motivation is precisely 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Said, Orientalism, 1-2. 12	  Ibid. 273.	  13	  Noam Chomsky, Profit over People: Neoliberalism and Global Order (New York: Seven Stories, 1999), 
29.	  14	  Ibid. 112.	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why an understanding of neoliberalism is necessary for an understanding of the Western 
discourse around the Egyptian revolution: international warfare generates profit.15  
One of the neoliberal state’s defining qualities is that it confronts political and 
international conflicts while failing – or perhaps avoiding – to address the systemic 
problems at the root of these conflicts.  In her essay, “Transnational Feminist Crossings: 
On Neoliberalism and Radical Critique,” transnational feminist theorist Chandra Talpade 
Mohanty describes both the neoliberal movement’s economic motivations and its 
sociopolitical consequences:  
Neoliberalism in the early twenty-first century is marked by market-based 
governance practices on the one hand (the privatization, commodification, 
and proliferation of difference) and authoritarian, national-security-driven 
penal state practices on the other. Thus, while neoliberal states facilitate 
mobility and cosmopolitanism (travel across borders) for some 
economically privileged communities, it is at the expense of the 
criminalization and incarceration (the holding in place) of impoverished 
communities.16 
 
The discourse critical for neoliberal states’ success yields a culture of 
neoliberalism.  Neoliberal culture is characterized by its focus on individualism as it 
obscures collective responsibility.  Neoliberalism eliminates the “social significance of 
racism, classism, or (hetero)sexism as institutionalized systems of power and inequality 
from the public domain,”17 and substitutes “individual prejudice and psychological 
dispositions or expressions of ‘hate’ instead.”18  The neoliberal lens becomes particularly 
dangerous when paired with the politics of representation because, as Mohanty writes, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Elizabeth Bernstein, and Janet Jakobsen, eds. “What Is Neoliberalism?” SF Online, Gender, Justice, and 
Neoliberal Transformations 11 no.1-11 no.2 (2012): n. pag. The Barnard Center for Research on Women. 
Web. 16	  Chandra Talpade Mohanty, “Transnational Feminist Crossings: On Neoliberalism and Radical Critique,” 
Signs 38 no.4 (2013): 967-91. 970. 17	  Mohanty, “Transnational,” 971.	  18	  Ibid.	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“[t]his representational, discursive politics of gender, race, class, sexuality, and nation 
[when] disconnected from its materialist moorings, can…be consumed more easily in 
institutional spaces.”19  
Two of these institutional spaces are within the contemporary Western feminist 
and antiracist movements.  The neoliberal state appropriates movements in order to 
advance market-based and authoritarian practices, as these movements themselves adopt 
neoliberal attitudes, particularly when commenting on affairs in the Global South.  As 
Mohanty writes, “the appropriation of feminism in the expansion of the neoliberal project 
is also visible in the depoliticized notion of difference mobilized by neoliberal state 
regimes.”20   
[N]eoliberal states use gender-and-development discourse to underwrite a 
retrenchment from radical feminist politics – delegitimating and 
domesticating such politics. The state is thus made “postfeminist” before 
feminists achieve gender justice! ...This shift in vocabulary from feminism 
to postfeminism and from race (and racism) to postrace (and postracism) 
in popular culture was meant to signify a movement beyond “old” forms 
of domination and inequality like racism, sexism, and (hetero)patriarchy.21 
 
In signifying that these “old forms of inequality” are relics of the past, the state 
effectively removes these issues from the larger conversation. Not only does the 
appropriation of feminist vocabulary undermine, as Mohanty asserts, feminist 
movements, but it also effectively obstructs the state’s nationalist movement.  As will be 
discussed in Chapter 2, this is precisely what has occurred in Egypt.   
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Ibid. 972.	  20	  Ibid. 	  21	  Ibid. 972 - 973.	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3.Neoliberal Orientalism 
Edward Said’s discussion of orientalism was largely rooted in understanding the 
connections between orientalism and colonialism. He examined predominantly colonial 
texts.  Orientalism was published in 1979, at the beginning of the neoliberal age. 
Contemporary Egypt is reflective of both colonialism and neoliberalism. While Said 
examined orientalism within a colonial context, I examine it within a neoliberal context. 
These two contexts are, however, deeply linked.  Gender and sexuality play a particular 
role in neoliberalism, just as they played a particular role in colonialism.  Their place in 
the Egyptian revolution is connected to their place in neoliberalism. 
As previously stated, orientalism is the process of Western identification of self in 
opposition to a distorted exoticized ‘Oriental.’  Neoliberal orientalism is the discourse of 
opposition to an oriental subject that provides justification for Western states to build and 
enforce neoliberal policies like structural adjustment programs.  While colonial 
governments blatantly controlled their colonies’ economic and political systems, 
neoliberal governments maintain a more subtle control over these systems in the form of 
interest-generating loans, for example.  Global South countries’ social welfare and 
commerce policies can therefore be dictated by the neoliberal states on which they are 
financially dependent.  Neoliberal states’ influence is subtle; instead of enforcing these 
policies themselves, they do so through transnational institutions like the IMF and World 
Bank.  In a less policy-driven sense, neoliberal orientalism is a contemporary orientalist 
outlook in which Western subjectivities adopt the persona of benevolent philanthropist 
and mentor as opposed to benevolent colonizer. 
 	   15	  
Neoliberal orientalism is not accidental.  It is the product of socioeconomic and 
political influences.   For example, humanistic ideals and movements mask social, 
political, and economic goals with orientalist representations that mobilize public 
response: oppressed women, starving children, violent men. These representations 
function as tools with which to influence public opinion for the numerous states and 
companies based in the Global North with significant economic or political stakes in the 




 The word “liminality” originates from the Latin word limen, which means 
“threshold.” Twentieth century ethnographer Arnold van Gennep first introduced this 
concept in his exploration of ritual’s three phases: the “preliminal (separation or 
isolation), liminal (in between or transitional), and postliminal (reintegration).”23  For van 
Gennep, the liminal state placed an individual on the threshold between separation and 
reintegration.  Cultural anthropologist Victor Turner popularized and expanded on this 
idea of the liminal state in his 1967 book The Forest of Symbols: Aspects of Ndembu 
Ritual.  According to Turner: 
 [L]iminality may perhaps be regarded as the Nay to all positive structural 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  For example, a list of the Top 10 American Corporations Profiting from Egypt’s Military names the ten 
largest US Department of Defense (DOD) contracts from 2009-2011 that included military aid to Egypt. 
This information was acquired from the DOD’s public online archive, which provides lists of its daily 
contracts since 1994. As both the Top 10 list and the DOD archives reveal, foreign wars in which the US is 
not directly involved can be quite profitable for the country. 
“Here Are the Top 10 American Corporations Profiting from Egypt’s Military,” Khamakarpresscom. N.p., 
August 17, 2013. Web. 
“Contract Archive,” Defense.gov: Contracts Archive, United States Department of Defense, n.d. Web. 23	  Arnold van Gennep, The Rites of Passage, trans. Monika B. Vizedom and Gabrielle L. Caffee (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1960 (1925)). 	  
From: Farha Ghannam, “Mobility, Liminality, and Embodiment in Urban Egypt,” American Ethnologist 
38, no.4 (2011): 790-800. 792.	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assertion, but as in some sense the source of them all, and, more than that, 
as a realm of pure possibility whence novel configurations of ideas and 
relations may arise.24 
 
In his article, “The Liminal Effects of Social Movements: Red Guards and the 
Transformation of Identity,” sociologist Goubin Yang explains Turner’s work, writing 
that when “ritual subjects” are removed from the “familiar space, the routine temporal 
order, or the structures of moral obligations and social ties, they enter a liminal 
time/space…[and] the transgression of norms and conventions becomes possible.”25  
Simply put, the liminal state disrupts, dismantles, and upends social and bureaucratic 
norms.  I argue that this description of the liminal state applies to that of a revolution.  
Liminality comes about in moments of transition – which revolutions are – and the 
“liminal persona,” according to Turner, is “at once no longer classified and not yet 
classified.”26 Liminality is a crucial component of this paper precisely due to this 
uncertainty surrounding classification. As I will demonstrate, Egypt’s liminal state of 
revolution repeatedly witnesses this declassification, reclassification, and non-
classification of gender.  
 
5. Gendered Tropes 
Tropes are literary devices of representation. But unlike clichés, tropes tend to 
control representation by attributing historically or culturally subjective meaning to the 
concepts and identity-based groups to which they refer. Colonial tropes and orientalist 
tropes link racial inferiority with the colonial subject. Gendered tropes result from similar 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  Victor Turner, The Forest of Symbols: Aspects of Ndembu Ritual, (Ithica, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1967), 97. 25	  Guobin Yang, “The Liminal Effects of Social Movements: Red Guards and the Transformation of 
Identity,” Sociological Forum 15, no.3 (2000): 379-406. 383.	  26	  Turner, The Forest, 96.	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linking based on traditional male and female roles.  They are symbolically laden 
representations of masculinities and femininities.  The “damsel in distress” is a gendered 
trope, as is the “emasculated man.”  Gendered tropes are numerous and continue to be 
socially reproduced in a variety of venues, from children’s toys and video game 
characters to political discourse.27 Tropes of femininity within an unstable revolutionary 
space tend to fall in two categories.  The first, a more positive representation of female 
participation in a revolution, frames women revolutionaries as “mothers” of the cause and 
nation, or even married to the revolution.  The second and more negative representation 
depicts female revolutionaries as deceitful figures defying their “natural” female roles.  
Political actors and foreign media implement these tropes to advance their particular 
narrative of the revolution.  They are, as Chapter 2 will explain, valuable weapons. 
 
Chapter Overview 
Chapter 1 will largely provide background information on the Egyptian revolution 
and urban Egyptian gender constructs. In the first section of this chapter, I will give 
background on the revolution and the political and cultural shifts that have accompanied 
it. In the second section, I will provide an overview of gender relations and roles in 
modern Egypt before and during the revolution. This will include a discussion of socially 
valued qualities and their strong association with Egyptian ideals of masculinity.  In the 
third section, I will explore the ways in which the revolution’s liminal state has had an 
effect on socially encouraged gender roles. This section will discuss the reinforcement of 
gender roles in times of instability and transition.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  See the website tvtropes.org for a long list of different gendered tropes in contemporary media. 
Tvtropes.org. N.p., n.d. Web. <http://tvtropes.org/pmwiki/pmwiki.php/Main/HomePage>. 
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Chapter 2 will focus on pro-woman rhetoric and the utilization of masculinity and 
femininity as political tools and justification for acts of violence in the Egyptian 
revolution.  This will primarily involve an examination of political accusations and their 
deployment of women’s rights language.  In the first section of this chapter, I will focus 
on the use of sexual violence in the revolution. In the second section I will discuss the 
post-Mubarak shift in social climate with regards to gender.  The third section will 
continue my discussion of the revolutionary state’s utilization of gender. While my 
discussion in Chapter 1 centers on privately encouraged gender roles, this section will 
center on the tropes of femininity reinforced by state bodies.  The third section of the 
chapter will explain the benefits of reinforcing gender roles and the systemic problems 
involved in this beneficial relationship. In the fourth section, I will discuss Egyptian 
feminist organizations’ work within the revolution. 
Chapter 3 will focus on neoliberal orientalism and the Western media coverage of 
the Egyptian revolution. This coverage has consistently employed gendered tropes in 
descriptions of the revolution and Egyptian society as a whole. These representations 
intersect with the equally ubiquitous orientalist representations of revolutionaries. In the 
first section I will examine the ways in which mainstream Western media utilizes 
narratives of femininity in its coverage of the Egyptian revolution.  The second section, 
engages the representations of masculinity most prominent in this coverage and these 
narratives. In the final section, I will demonstrate the ways in which the West benefits 
from representations of orientalized masculinities and femininities.  
The paper will close with an examination of the tactical players mentioned and 
reiterate how these players’ misrepresentations of the respective causes they claim to 
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support in fact exacerbate the challenges faced by these very causes.  Before 
deconstructing these representations, however, one must understand the forces 
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CHAPTER 1: BACKGROUND 
 
The Revolution 
January 25th, 2011: the first day of the Egyptian Revolution.  Masses gathered on 
Tahrir Square to protest President Hosni Mubarak’s regime.  Seventeen days after the 
first protestor stepped up to the square, Mubarak stepped down from his near three-
decade presidency, leaving the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) temporarily in 
charge of the Egyptian government.  The Egyptian Military led by the SCAF was popular 
with the protesters in the early days of the revolution.  When Mubarak demanded that 
they join his personal State Security Forces in taking up arms against the protesters, the 
military refused, choosing instead to stand with their fellow citizens.  In her book, Live 
and Die Like a Man: Gender Dynamics in Urban Egypt, Farha Ghannam writes of the 
national solidarity flourishing in Cairo during the revolution’s first eighteen days:  
During the eighteen days that led to the demise of Mubarak’s rule, Midan 
al-Tahrir was transformed into an epicenter of moral geography that 
connected Egyptians in various locations into the same political and 
ethical project. Despite initial clashes with the police, the demonstrators 
continued to grow in numbers. The police withdrew on January 28, when 
they were replaced by members of the army who declared that they would 
not shoot at the protestors.28 
 
The removal of Mubarak’s regime signified the removal of restrictive law, such as the 
banning of the Muslim Brotherhood, an oppositional political party; the 1998 Law 6 on 
thuggery and the 1967 emergency law, which essentially legalized police harassment of 
young Egyptian men; and intensive surveillance.29 However, as the parliamentary and 
presidential elections approached, the military engaged in increasingly hostile 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  Farha Ghannam, Live and Die Like a Man: Gender Dynamics in Urban Egypt (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2013), 126.	  29	  Ibid. 122.	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confrontations with protestors. On June 24th 2012, Mohammed Morsi became the first 
democratically elected president of Egypt.  Many rejoiced upon hearing this news while 
others remained apprehensive given Morsi’s status as a member of the Muslim 
Brotherhood.30  Concern grew when, several months later, Morsi granted himself 
executive power, securing immunity from judicial review and protecting the disbanding 
of the predominantly Muslim Brotherhood upper house of parliament.  Days of protests 
followed, leading to months of clashes between pro- and anti-Morsi Egyptians.  
Demonstrations against Morsi intensified, and on July 3, 2013, the Egyptian military 
removed Morsi from power and arrested leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood. Once in 
power, the SCAF reinstated some of Mubarak’s most unpopular laws, such as Law 6, 
reverting to the same Mubarak-era policies that contributed to the criminalization of 
Egyptian youth. As was the case under Mubarak, the SCAF government deployed fear-
mongering tactics centered on the threat of deviant masculinities31 – baltagiyya – in order 
to “generate a sense of chaos that [has] justified the need for heavy policing over various 
spaces and groups.”32 All of these developments led to further violence between pro-and 
anti-Morsi protesters, as well as extreme attacks by the military on public demonstrations 
and sit-ins. It remains unclear how or when the violence will stop.     
 Amidst the violence, the sitting governments – first Morsi’s Muslim Brotherhood-
staffed administration and then the current military regime – continue their attempts to 
draft a new Egyptian constitution.   Ghannam writes that as time went on “the unity of the 
protestors was fragmented…many of the men and women who were the driving force 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  The Muslim Brotherhood was outlawed under Mubarak’s reign due to its powerful base and therefore 
credible threat to his power. 31	  I will discuss this construction of masculinity further in the following section: Gender Roles in Egypt. 32	  Ghannam, Live and Die, 123.	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behind the revolution [were] increasingly excluded from the political system.”33  This 
was particularly the case for female revolutionaries who were “largely excluded from the 
drafting of Egypt’s new constitution.”34  A gradual exclusion of women in the revolution 
preceded this exclusion of women in the political sphere.  Although Tahrir Square was a 
space of unity during the first eighteen days of the revolution – one in which “millions of 
men and women (young and old, Muslim and Copt, rich and poor, religious and secular) 
came together and saw each other as fellow citizens with similar concerns, aspirations, 
and goals”35 – this soon began to change.  Women grew increasingly unwelcome among 
the protests.  Prior to this shift, “[w]omen had a designated space to sleep in the middle 
[of the square] to be fully protected.”36 Female protestors could once attend 
demonstrations in Tahrir Square safe from harassment or assault, but many 
demonstrations shifted from sites of empowerment to danger zones for women.  As the 
revolution’s climate changed, so did the nation’s gender climate; the two are unavoidably 
related.  
 
Gender Roles in Egypt 
To truly understand the revolution’s changes and the roles gender continues to 
play, one must first comprehend what it meant to “do gender” in colonized Egypt, and 
what “doing gender” means in contemporary urban Egyptian environments; in short, the 
social roles and values attributed to ideal masculinities and femininities. Egyptian 
masculinities under British rule were conceptualized – by British colonizers – in two 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  Ibid. 172.	  34	  Ibid.	  35	  Ibid. 171.	  36	  Ibid. 172.	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general ways, one associated with rural and the other with urban life. The rural oriental 
masculine subject was “rough” and behaved in, as colonial administrator Lord Edward 
Cecil once said, “the rather jolly ways of the peasant.”37  The urban or “effendi” oriental 
masculine subject – associated with the bureaucratic elite – had an “oily, snake-like 
manner.”38 The British colonizers viewed rural Egyptian masculinity as “native” or 
“natural” Egyptian masculinity, whereas they represented effendi masculinity as a failed – 
and perhaps deceitful – imitation of their own ‘civilized’ ways. Negative depictions of 
effendi masculinity and the effendi class intentionally tarnished well-educated Egyptians’ 
images, and diminished the threat they posed to British rule.39 Although British 
colonizers ascribed these masculinities, the constructions are unavoidably part of 
colonialism’s legacy and therefore influence contemporary understandings and 
performances of masculinity. Anti-colonial masculinities developed, in many ways, in 
opposition to these colonial and oriental paragons. Indeed, effendi remains an insult in 
contemporary Egyptian language.40 
Ghannam writes in Live and Die Like a Man that local contemporary 
constructions of gender in Cairo revolve around the notion, “ir-raagil raagil, wis-sitt 
sitt,” or “a man is a man and a woman is a woman.”41  Ghannam elaborates on one 
construction of masculinity: 
The notions of raagil bi saheeh or raagil bi gad (a real or true man) and 
gada‘ refer to a man who excels in materializing social norms that define a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  Wilson Chacko Jacob, Working out Egypt: Effendi Masculinity and Subject Formation in Colonial 
Modernity, 1870-1940, (Durham: Duke UP, 2011), 48.	  38	  Ibid.	  39	  Ibid. 48-49.	  40	  Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot “Mud-Slinging Egyptian Style” Journal of the American Research Center 
in Egypt 30, (1993): 189 - 192. 190. 41	  Ghannam, Live and Die, 53.  
See also: Sawsan Messiri, Ibn Al-balad: A Concept of Egyptian Identity (Leiden: Brill, 1978). 
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proper man, including intelligence, valor, toughness, and decency. The 
adjective gada‘na refers to a mix of gallantry and “nobility, audacity, 
responsibility, generosity, vigor, and manliness.” A gada‘ is a person 
“who…generally acts within the moral universe of Egyptian popular 
classes…[and] does not accept injustice or tyranny and usually stands for 
the weak against the strong.” 42 
 
Ghannam’s description, developed from her ten-year ethnographic study of the al-Zawiya 
neighborhood in Cairo, sheds light on a version of ideal urban Egyptian masculinity and 
the values and qualities essential to the acquisition of this identity.  Egyptian cultural 
constructions of masculinity and femininity do not place these two genders in a binary. 
Rather, they are presented as distinct from, but not inaccessible to, one another. Ghannam 
clarifies this, writing, “not all men are gid‘aan (plural of gada‘) and that not all gid‘aan 
are men.” 43  Ideal masculine qualities such as nobility, intelligence, morality, and honor 
are not innately and exclusively ascribed to men.44 Were that the case, ideal masculinity 
would be far more of an inherent male property in urban Egypt than it is.  Rather, as 
Ghannam explains: 
[B]ecause the qualities that define a proper man could be detached from 
the male body and reattached to other bodies, materializing social norms 
over and over becomes an important part of the making of proper men.45 
 
Ghannam later adds: “Action, not gender, determines who deserves this label and who 
does not.”46  As Ghannam demonstrates, the simple possession of a male body and one’s 
identity as a male-bodied person do not necessarily entitle one to the respect granted 
those with the qualities of gada‘.  Individuals must constantly work to achieve and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  Ghannam Live and Die, 53-54.	  43	  Ibid. 54.  44	  See: Beth Baron, “Constructing Egyptian Honor,” in Egypt as a Woman: Nationalism, Gender, and 
Politics (Berkeley: U of California, 2005), 40-56. 45	  Ghannam, Live and Die, 55. 46	  Ibid. 122.	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maintain this status.47 As will be discussed in the following section, the revolution’s 
liminal state exacerbated gada‘’s unguaranteed – and thereby unstable – nature. 
 Although gada‘ is seen as entirely positive and chiefly masculine, its converse 
qualities – mirakhrakh (being weak or soft), khawal (submissiveness), khafeef (overly 
talkative, foolish) – while seen as wholly negative, are not viewed as feminine.48  They 
are adverse to ideals of masculinity, but this in no way makes them feminine. Rather, in 
their opposition to gada‘, they are largely undesirable qualities regardless of the gender 
of the person to whom they are attached. As Ghannam explains: 
What is at stake is not the risk of feminization but of emasculation, of not 
being viewed as a real man. A proper man is not created by or through a 
simple binary opposition between male and female but through elaborate 
differentiation between modes of doing and being a man.49 
 
One may be a man, but this holds little social value unless one does what it means to be a 
man.  The opposition of genders is not the frame of reference for masculinity and 
femininity in this case; primarily masculine ideals are what matter when “doing” both 
urban Egyptian masculinities and femininities.   
One of the ways for a man to “do masculinity” is through socially sanctioned acts 
of violence. A socially acceptable motivation for violence might be the preservation of a 
woman’s honor.  “Using violence to protect female relatives, especially when they are 
threatened sexually, is socially expected, accepted, and legitimized.”50  Although the 
male act of “doing masculinity” is in this case reliant on the notion of a vulnerable 
woman, the true oppositional identity to the ideal gid‘aan is not helpless femininity but 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47	  Jacob, Working out Egypt, 56. 48	  Ghannam, Live and Die, 56. 	  49	  Ibid. 56.	  50	  Ibid.109.	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baltagiyya—the label for criminals and thugs.51 “[T]he complex meanings that people 
attach to the use of physical force and its relationship to masculinity” demonstrate social 
importance of this opposition.52 While an understanding of femininity is unimportant in 
this opposition – the potentially victimized female body that is to be protected is simply 
the site of confrontation between gid‘aan and baltagiyya – its relationship to masculinity 
is partially a byproduct of the gid‘aan and baltagiyya opposition.  In addition to “social 
conventions, cultural meanings, legal codes, and religious discourses, force is 
occasionally used to support inequalities among men and women.”53   
Ghannam does not explore in depth constructions of femininity in urban Egypt in 
her ethnography. She implies that femininity is, in many ways, irrelevant to this 
construction of masculinity. Although femininity does not necessarily inform 
masculinity, this masculine construct is central to the ideal of Egyptian femininity. A 
woman who embodies crucial gada‘ qualities may be deemed gad‘a – the feminine 
version of gada‘ – or even sitt bi meet raagil, a woman who “equals a hundred men.”54  
Other words have similar associations.  Paul Amar, professor of International and Global 
Studies at UC Santa Barbara, borrows Judith Halberstam’s term “female masculinities”55 
in his article, “Middle East Masculinity Studies: Discourses of ‘Men in Crisis,’ Industries 
of Gender in Revolution,” to describe Egyptian female factory workers “who are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51	  Ibid. 19.	  52	  Ibid. 110.	  53	  Ibid.	  54	  Ibid. 54. 55	  Judith Halberstam, Female Masculinity (Durham: Duke UP, 1998).	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described positively as mu’alima and jada’a56 (courageous, macho, masterful).”57 Amar 
writes that these women “were at the forefront of the 2011 Egyptian Revolution.”58   
In colonized Egypt, another word normatively associated with – but not restricted 
to – masculinity was wakil, which, although used as “proxy” or “trustee,” literally means 
“one who is entrusted.”59  Wilson Chacko Jacob, a scholar of History, Middle Eastern, 
and Islamic Studies, expands on this in his book, Working out Egypt: Effendi Masculinity 
and Subject Formation in Colonial Modernity, 1870-1940.  Jacob writes: 
The defense, sustenance, and advocacy of the weak and the voiceless 
presumed in the definition of wakil also presumed a conception of 
masculinity. Adulthood and masculinity are normatively located in the 
male person at the moment he begins to demonstrate an ability to protect 
and provide for others.60 
 
Jacob’s use of the word “presumed” suggests that these associations were not 
fixed, but assumed.  Additionally, he writes that wakil qualities must be 
demonstrated; they do not exist in a male person simply by virtue of his maleness.  
As Jacob’s work suggests, the possibility of a woman demonstrating these 
qualities and achieving “adulthood” and gad‘a has existed for over a century in 
Egypt. 
However, at least contemporarily, a woman can only acquire these labels if she 
also presents a physically female identity through her social behavior dress, marriage, and 
role as a mother. A woman who presents socially masculine tendencies – male gestures 
and clothing, for example – is alternately labeled mistargila.  Ghannam, writes:  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  56	  Jada’a is the same word as gada’a; it is simply transliterated differently. 57	  Paul Amar, “Middle East Masculinity Studies: Discourses of ‘Men in Crisis,’ Industries of Gender in 
Revolution,” Journal of Middle East Women's Studies 7, no.3 (2011): 36-70. 41.	  58	  Amar, “Middle East Masculinity,” 41.	  59	  Jacob, Working out Egypt, 53.	  60	  Ibid. 56. Emphasis mine.	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While the first [gad‘a] is a type of complement [sic] and celebrates a 
woman who excels in materializing some key norms linked to masculinity, 
mistargila is a critique of a female who is trying to publicly embody 
men’s ways of being.61  
 
The ideal Egyptian woman strives to be gad‘a – an achievement that gains its 
power from its primary association with masculinity – yet maintains a decidedly non-
masculine external appearance. Lucie Ryvoza discusses this two-pronged Egyptian 
femininity in her article “‘I am a Whore but I will be a Good Mother’: On the Production 
and Consumption of the Female Body in Modern Egypt.”  As Ryvoza writes, “in modern 
Egyptian culture, women were produced and consumed as two different things at the 
same time.”62  
Masculinity heavily influences ideas of Egyptian womanhood.  Ghannam 
emphasizes that while masculinity is not contingent on femininity, “women are active in 
the making of men,” as mothers have a crucial part in the raising of sons.63  But despite 
this central female role, a vast inequality exists between the social values attributed to 
mothering and fathering: 
[T]he fathers are credited for the positive conduct of their sons while 
mothers are usually blamed when sons fail to conform to social norms that 
define proper masculine conduct. Such misrecognition ensures the 
reproduction of inequalities that configure relationships not only between 
men and women but also between young and older men. It allows men to 
continue to be strongly associated with positive meanings and socially 
cherished values while women endure the burden of being associated with 
socially unacceptable and stigmatized meanings.64 
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Female Body in Modern Egypt," The Arab Studies Journal 12/13, no.2/1 (Fall 2004/Spring 2005): 80-122. 
82.  63	  Ghannam, Live and Die, 117.	  64	  Ibid. 117-118.	  
 	   29	  
In short, this “misrecognition” perpetuates highly gendered practices of social 
reproduction.  This same misrecognition extends beyond familial practices of social 
reproduction. It also perpetuates socially sanctioned and gendered public responses to 
sexual harassment and violence against women in urban Egypt.   
 
Gender Roles in the Liminal State 
The previous section provided an overview of Egyptian constructions of gender.  
The following section explores how and why revolutions impact gender constructions. 
Revolutions and wars occupy a liminal space that upends traditional roles; expressions of 
gender shift to best serve the revolution. For example, female revolutionaries’ 
participation in the public act of revolution blurs the separation between public and 
private spheres and male and female roles.65 One of the common responses to this 
transitional and unstable state is to reinforce traditional gender roles as a way of both 
mobilizing support for a cause and maintaining some semblance of conventional social 
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structure.66  Farha Ghannam, in a precursor essay to her book, writes that these 
transitional spaces are “fields of potentialities not only for the reinforcement of class and 
gender distinctions but also for their redefinition.”67  
Revolutions are envisioned as primarily male spaces.  Therefore revolutionary 
transitions and redefinitions occur on socially designated sites of masculinity.  In her 
book The Revolution Question: Feminisms in El Salvador, Chile, and Cuba, Women’s 
Studies scholar Julie D. Shayne repeatedly references the “male vanguard” that dominate 
revolutionary spaces.68 Due to the normatively assumed association between masculinity 
and violence, and between violence and revolution, revolutions are demarcated as 
masculine endeavors.69  Despite revolutionary spaces’ purported monolithic “maleness,” 
they are in actuality ripe with the redefinition of social roles.  A revolutionary space 
removes individuals from “familiar space, the routine temporal order, or the structures of 
moral obligations and social ties,” they once occupied.70 With the arrival of revolution, 
these individuals “enter a liminal time/space…[and] the transgression of norms and 
conventions becomes possible.”71 Therefore revolutionaries can transgress gender norms 
and conventions.  This is particularly the case with regards to female revolutionaries, 
whose mere presence subverts the conception of revolutionary spaces as exclusively 
male.   
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Female participation in revolution initially threatens the idea of mutually 
dependent male and female spheres, partially because, as Shayne writes, “Revolutionary 
movements do not in and of themselves pose challenges to patriarchal structures, 
especially at the micro level of the family.”72  The revolutionary space copes with the 
intrusion of women revolutionaries by reframing female participation as an expression of 
conventional femininity. Shayne explains: 
In…revolutionary structure, women played roles shaped by the 
assumptions surrounding what it means to be a woman. That is, a truly 
feminine being is expected to be apolitical, which was anything but 
accurate.”73  
 
This repackaging, Shayne argues, is intentional and far from benign. Rather, 
gender is “exploited and transformed” through the participation of female 
revolutionaries.74  Often this exploitation comes in the form of framing women’s 
relationships to the revolutionary cause in gendered ways, employing the positive tropes 
of revolutionary femininity mentioned in this paper’s Gendered Tropes section.  
Common examples of this are touting the “marriage” of female revolutionaries to the 
cause, or labeling them “mothers” of the revolution.75  With these normative 
representations, women retain their “womanliness” despite participating in violent or 
political (read: male) activities. Although the representations shift to include less 
normatively feminine activity in revolution’s liminal space, they simultaneously reinforce 
the ideal womanhood from which they stem.  “The value of women’s participation in 	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revolutionary movements was simultaneously enhanced and limited by traditional notions 
of femininity.”76  While these traditional constructions of femininity aid the acceptance of 
female participation, they also bolster a more polarized conception of femininity. The 
socially appropriate female revolutionary and the deviant female revolutionary can be 
understood within Ryvoza’s dual framing of Egyptian femininity.  For Ryvoza, there are 
“two apparently contradictory modes of [female] representation.”77  The first, “the 
sensual female-as-body” is used to represent deviant women revolutionaries, while the 
second, “the woman as a social being, a potential mother of nation-builders” represents a 
maternal relationship with the revolution.78 Both dimensions of this dual femininity are in 
play in the revolution’s gendered discourse.   
This conception of femininity remains beyond the confines of the revolutionary 
space. The expanded roles for women – however rooted in traditional womanhood they 
may be – do not.  As Shayne explains, “[T]he roles that women held were specific to the 
context of war and not transferable to the civilian society which followed the 
insurrection.” Gender is a useful restabilizing tool in a post-revolutionary state.  As 
Shayne’s statement that revolutionary movements do not challenge the patriarchy 
emphasizes, constructions of ideal womanhood and masculine hegemonic structure do 
not, at their core, change in the course of a revolutionary movement.  They are largely 
static and thereby useful tools for the reformation of a once-unstable society; they are the 
social constants because they are reinforced in the midst of the revolution.  The post-
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revolutionary state can, for example, emphasize normative representations of gender such 
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CHAPTER 2: THE USE OF GENDER IN THE REVOLUTION 
 
In this chapter, I will discuss how key political figures and movements – primarily 
the SCAF and Muslim Brotherhood – have used the problem of sexual violence and 
gender inequality in the revolution to make accusations that serve their political goals. 
Public perception is critical in contemporary international conflicts due to the amount of 
coverage these conflicts receive. The media influences public perception with what and 
how it reports. Media can give a movement traction, render it invisible, or denounce it as 
an adversary. Media is therefore as powerful a weapon in contemporary warfare as 
stones, guns, and tanks. This power is not lost on the revolution’s political figures.  As 
Arabic literary scholar Miriam Cooke explains in Gendering War Talk, “Postmodern 
wars are fought by the media but also, in a very important way, for the media…in the 
postmodern battlefield, all strive for representation”80 
While political factions claim to be committed to gender equality in the 
revolution, they consistently impede its goals: For example, despite speaking out against 
sexual violence against women on several occasions, the Free Egyptians Party fails to 
support female leadership within its ranks. Not only did the party initially form a 
“Committee of Wise Men,” which, as the name suggests, excluded women,81 but Ahmed 
Said, a member of the Free Egyptians Party’s presidential council publically stated his 
unwillingness to entertain the idea of female parliamentary candidates: “We are entering 
fierce elections and we need to win as many seats as we can, and this means there are not 	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many women…in our lists.”82  A glaring discrepancy exists between the party’s actions 
and its stated fundamental values, the latter of which includes “the integral role of women 
in society and the need to empower them in all domains, especially in public office.”83 
Although the Free Egyptians Party has also spoken out against sexual violence against 
women – and has made sure to implicate the Muslim Brotherhood while doing so84 – it 
prioritizes winning parliamentary seats over ensuring equal political participation for 
women. Political actors like Ahmed Said may be genuinely invested in the cause of 
women’s rights but obstruct its advancement because they fail to address the 
government’s structural gender inequalities. Responses to the sexual violence 
increasingly highlighted in (or by) the revolution indicate the carelessness with which the 
government and media address gender issues.   
The examples from Egyptian media I present are drawn from a limited pool of 
sources.  They have either been translated from Arabic – leaving open the possibility of 
mistranslation; a dangerous prospect when analyzing language – or were originally 
published in English – suggesting that they were written for a foreign or Western-
educated audience.  I will note when a source has been translated; if no reference to 
translation is made, one can assume that the text was originally written in English.  It is 
also important to note that this is not a comprehensive review of gender in Egyptian 
politics and media. Instead, the following examples indicate a pattern of unsubstantiated 
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concern for women’s rights within Egypt’s sociopolitical climate.  This pattern itself is 
what is under observation. 
 
Sexual Violence in the Revolution 
 Sexual violence – primarily perpetrated by men against women – has long been a 
problem in Egypt, as it is in the rest of the world.  The revolutionary context made more 
public and generated greater attention to gender-based violence in Egypt.  The 
revolution’s first public instance of sexual violence against women occurred on March 9, 
2011, when the Egyptian military stormed a peaceful sit-in in Tahrir Square that was held 
in protest of the military’s use of violence against civilians, mere weeks after its 
establishment of an interim government.  Armed with machetes and knives, members of 
the SCAF cleared the square and arrested over one hundred protestors, eighteen of whom 
were women.  SCAF officers beat and gave electric shocks to all eighteen women, and 
strip-searched all but one, forcing them “to submit to ‘virginity tests,’” a practice in 
which someone penetrates a woman’s vagina, claiming to try to determine whether or not 
her hymen has broken.85   
 Other forms of sexual violence have taken place within the revolution’s protests 
themselves. These cases of sexual violence are widely reported in both national and 
foreign media, both because disclosing them does not require confrontation with the 
military, but also because Western women have experienced them.86  The sexual violence 
that occurs in the midst of the revolution’s public protests are essentially tactical and 
strategically executed public gang rapes. A publication entitled “Sexual Assault and Rape 	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in Tahrir Square and its Vicinity: A Compendium of Sources 2011-2013,” produced by 
the El-Nadeem Center for Rehabilitation of Victims of Violence and Torture, Nazra for 
Feminist Studies, and the New Woman Foundation, details the methodical way in which 
these attacks occur: 
[A] group surrounds the victims, the number increases and she is almost 
suffocated inside the circle, tens of hands pull her in every direction, tens 
of hands mess with any part of the body under siege, tens of hands strip 
off the victims (what they fail to remove manually, the use white weapons 
to remove), those surrounding her have said, according to most 
testimonies “do not be afraid; I’m protecting you”. Meanwhile, his hands 
are ravaging her body. Another says, “you are like my sister; do not be 
afraid”, for sexual phrases commonly used by perpetrators to kidnap a 
victim and rape her in an isolated area are usually not used.87 
  
This revolution is not the first case Egypt has witnessed of mass sexual violence 
within a political protest.  On May 25, 2005 – now known as “Black Wednesday” – 
women were similarly assaulted in the midst of an anti-Mubarak protest.  Perpetrated by 
both plainclothes policemen and hired baltagiyya, these attacks were specifically aimed 
at disrupting the protests and intimidating female participants.  This same tactic continues 
to be used within the revolution.  A report from Nazra for Feminist Studies entitled “One 
Year of Impunity: Violations Against Women Human Rights Defenders in Egypt from 
August to December 2011,” states: 
[A]t heart, [these] violations…are concerned with the female body as the 
site of the ultimate contesting power. Such violations not only aim to 
“break” the woman involved, to push her perpetually into the private 
sphere, but to signal, to an entire population, to beware the viciousness 
that can unfold, a message that will hopefully push everyone out of the 
public sphere for good.88 	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 The use of sexual violence against women as a deterrent or destabilizing force is 
not novel; as the Nazra publication declares, women’s bodies frequently serve as the sites 
on which conflicts are waged.89  “Black Wednesday” was not an isolated incident in the 
Mubarak era.  The following year, Egyptian bloggers alerted the public to group sexual 
assaults in downtown Cairo’s holiday festivities at the end of Ramadan.  As Egyptian 
feminist writer and activist Mariam Kirollos wrote of these assaults in a piece for 
Jadaliyya, an online journal focusing on the Arab world, “This crime continues to occur 
in public spaces, especially during public holidays, and lately during political protests.”90  
Yet while the assaults themselves are not new, the political ambiguity surrounding them 
is.  Under the Mubarak regime, there was little doubt as to who was responsible for 
civilian harassment and attacks: the police force and their hired thugs.  But within the 
revolutionary space, with its upending of stable society, these same attacks are swathed in 
anonymity.  This anonymity – the very real possibility that one’s fellow citizens and 
revolutionaries might in an instant become one’s rapist – only enhances the social climate 
that El-Nadeem and Nazra describe as resembling “a daily psychological war on 
women.”91  The following section explores the manifestation of sexual violence and its 
connection to tropes of femininity in Egypt’s revolutionary and liminal context. 
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A Shift in Social Climate and the Use of Female Tropes 
Nazra and El-Nadeem’s collections of testimonies from sexual assault survivors 
and witnesses illustrate perpetrators’ use of female tropes to inflict psychological wounds 
on their victims.92  These wounds engage with the female tropes made more restrictive in 
attempts to restabilize Egypt’s revolutionary state.  In this section I will first explore how 
female tropes manifest specifically in Egypt’s liminal space.  Then I will discuss how 
these tropes are used within the revolution.   
Female participation in a revolutionary space might appear to threaten ideals of 
womanhood, but as Ghannam explained in Live and Die Like a Man, this is not 
necessarily the case in Egypt.  A gada‘ “does not accept injustice or tyranny and usually 
stands for the weak against the strong.”93 The same should be true for a gad‘a. The 
demonstrations of unity in the revolution’s early days imply that this was the case; 
women and men protested side-by-side and were initially praised by members of their 
communities for the same displays of gid‘aan. Female activists embody gada‘ in 
different ways, some of which are religiously compelled and influenced.   
As the revolution progressed, the ideal woman revolutionary was redefined and 
her femaleness more pronounced.  In March 2011’s Cairo University protests demanding 
the replacement of the university president and deans – many of the top university 
administrators had political ties to the Mubarak regime – an overnight sit-in raised 
questions of modesty.  The variety of tactics used in this particular protest demonstrates 
the widespread participation of women from different faiths and political groups.  While 
many secular female protestors challenged the “social belief that it is inappropriate for a 	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decent woman to spend the night outside her home, and to make matters worse, in a space 
in which males would also be spending the night,” more religious women did not feel 
comfortable doing so.94  All encountered some resistance from male protestors who felt 
that a female presence overnight could complicate or even impede the protests’ mission. 
Male protestors opposed to the integrated overnight sit-in provided rational heavily laden 
with tropes of femininity.  Some initially used the impropriety angle, others contended 
that women’s presence would be “draining.”95 If security forces stormed the sit-in, the 
male protestors would be responsible for protecting their female counterparts.96  Secular 
women challenged the latter argument, asserting their self-sufficiency and equal stake in 
the cause. Religious women challenged the former argument and compensated for their 
untraditional choice to remain at the sit-in by emphasizing their traditional femaleness 
and respectability in other ways.  A group of female university students gathered in one 
area of the sit-in to read the Quran together.  As Nazra’s “One Year of Impunity” report 
states: 
[T]he female students affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood decided to 
challenge the stereotype of the woman who sleeps outside her home by 
associating it with engaging in  a religious activity, making it harder to 
argue that the women participating in the sit-in are “indecent.”97 
 
The very fact that female students faced resistance from male supporters with a variety of 
political affiliations to their spending the night at the sit-in demonstrates a shift in social 
climate.  After all, female protestors with a variety of religious and political affiliations 
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slept in tents in Tahrir Square during the revolution’s first eighteen days.98 The square 
had designated female areas, which were often surrounded by the occupants’ male 
relatives.  Appropriate and ideal femininity was not irrelevant – the protective presence of 
male relatives demonstrates this – but in this eighteen-day period, emphasized gender 
roles simply did not take precedence.  The nation was wholly united against Mubarak.   
After Mubarak’s regime fell the revolution become more chaotic. This chaos 
prompted the reinforcement of gender roles as socially restabilizing tools.  Male 
revolutionaries faced the threat of the liminal state’s social upheaval both as a physical 
threat of violence, and as an emotional threat – the destabilization of certain male roles.  
Urban Egyptian constructions of masculinity are deeply tied to the ability to protect.  A 
male revolutionary might be physically unable to protect the women around him. Female 
revolutionaries such as the secular women at the sit-in might reject his protection. Either 
of these instances could threaten one’s sense of self, one’s sense of maleness.  Nazra’s 
“One Year of Impunity” report contends that a common reaction to this threat might be 
anger:  “Faced with women who do not conform to the typical stereotypes of ‘decency’ 
and ‘complacency,’ the urge to subjugate such women is magnified.”99  Female 
participation in the revolution, initially unchallenged in mainstream society, perhaps 
developed an association with threats to masculinity.  The same actions that once won 
them approval and even the label of gada‘ were reframed to match this threat.  One of the 	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most effective ways to accomplish this was through the sexualization of female 
revolutionaries or Women Human Rights Defenders (WHRD), the term Nazra uses.   
Women are…stigmatized, and sexualized, as “deviant” whenever they 
organize as women, not only by state actors, but by private citizens as 
well. This is as violations committed by security forces do not take place 
in a vacuum, but are rather cosseted by a culture that condones the 
violence committed, embedded with patriarchal norms about the 
“appropriate” roles for women. Sexuality thus becomes a tool and a 
weapon used by a range of actors to control women’s bodily integrity, and 
to hamper women’s political participation, mobility, and freedoms of 
association and expression.100 
 
Many of the testimonies Nazra and El-Nadeem collected document what Nazra terms 
“sexuality baiting,” the “strategic manipulation of prejudices about ‘appropriate’ female 
roles, ascribing a negative connotation of sexuality to WHRDs.”101  As “Dalia”102 told 
Nazra: “A higher-ranking officer instructed the soldiers to leave us, telling them ‘we do 
not kill women,’ to which a soldier responded ‘but they are whores and Christians.’”103 
Similar testimonies include devaluing words like “daughter of a bitch,” “daughter of a 
whore,” and “slut.”104 
 Nazra’s accounts illustrate the members of the liminal space’s use of social 
justifications for committing acts of sexual violence.  The most common justification 
seems to be a denial of the violation altogether.  Nazra argues that attackers’ frequent 
claim of “protecting” the very women they are violating is a strategic tactic to dissuade 
any bystanders who truly wish to help.  Not only is this strategy useful for the prevention 
of bystander intervention, but it also allows the attackers to adopt a reframed mantle of 
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protective masculinity.  These attacks are aimed at dissuading women from publicly 
participating in the revolution. The “strategic manipulation of prejudices about 
‘appropriate’ female roles” justifies this goal.  Publicly reascribed as “deviant” women 
who threaten Egyptian society, female revolutionaries become socially sanctioned targets 
of attack.  The strategic “sexuality baiting” that Nazra describes is so effective that some 
attackers internalize its mentality and convince themselves that they are acting as 
protectors.  An anonymous woman’s description of her attack suggests this possibility: 
I felt a despair that led me to call into the man in front of me, that I was 
hiding behind to cover my nakedness, and whose hands were stroking my 
behind. I implored him, told him that I was a mother – which is true – that 
he was a brave and valiant man that I chose to protect me. I begged him to 
make way so that I can escape to the field hospital. I do not really know 
what drove this harasser to save me after I begged him... and I do not 
know how he suddenly raised his belt, beating everyone around him, 
frantically screaming, ‘I will protect her... I will protect her’. I do not 
know how his conscience was awakened, but I found myself crawling to 
the field hospital.105    
 
This woman appealed to one of her attackers’ sense of masculinity and the social value 
ascribed to gada‘na.  She gave him the opportunity to be gada‘, and he took it.     
Gendered distinctions were not the only social differences given more attention in 
the revolution; the elimination of a common enemy solidified political and religious 
differences as well.  While this section discussed conversational reinforcements of female 
tropes, the next section will examine political bodies’ and figures’ reinforcements and 
utilization of these tropes.  It will also discuss the increased tension between political 
groups, namely the SCAF, and the Muslim Brotherhood’s political organization: the 
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Freedom and Justice Party.  State-sponsored reinforcement of feminine tropes appears 
most consistently in the discourse surrounding sexual violence in the revolution.106 
 
Political Use of Female Tropes and Responses to Sexual Violence in the Revolution 
When the revolution began, the political and activist parties involved expressed 
support and encouragement for the revolution’s female participants.  The Muslim 
Brotherhood, for example, praised female participation in the revolution on its website, 
IkhwanWeb, commending “the sisters” as “the backbone of the Muslim Brotherhood.”107 
This same April 4, 2011 press release also declared: 
With the ousting of the dictator Mubarak and the toppling of his tyrannical 
regime tribute must be given to the daughters, mothers, sisters and wives 
of members of the Muslim Brotherhood who undoubtedly engaged in 
unconditionally supporting their other halves.108   
 
The latter statement depicts women revolutionaries as support systems and emphasizes 
their positions within a nuclear family.  However, only two months earlier, the website 
mentioned female revolutionaries without the framework of traditional femininity.  On 
February 12, 2011, The Brotherhood released this statement: 
The MB reminds the masses that the great revolution could not have come 
about without the inevitable sacrifices, referring to the young men and 
women who paid with their lives so that others may live in freedom.109 
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This post, along with another on February 4, which listed “women’s organizations” in a 
list of groups equally “united in their demand for a fundamental change in 
government,”110 notes female participation without qualifying it with tropes of 
femininity.  However, as the revolution began to fracture, the Muslim Brotherhood 
invoked feminine tropes to restabilize its social base.   
 The Muslim Brotherhood organization and its political branch, the Freedom and 
Justice Party, employed positive tropes of femininity: representing women 
revolutionaries favorably, despite reducing them to secondary participants.  The SCAF, 
on the other hand, invoked largely negative tropes of femininity. This negative spin was 
particularly visible when the SCAF addressed the revolution’s sexual violence epidemic.  
In April 2012, then commander-in-chief of the SCAF, and current presidential candidate, 
Abdul Fattah al-Sisi responded to the public outrage over the military’s use of “virginity 
tests.”  General Sisi defended the use of the “tests,” which he argued were done “to 
protect the girls from rape, and the soldiers and officers from accusations of rape.”111  
Sisi not only dismisses the possibility that “virginity tests” are in fact rape, but also 
suggests that a woman can only be raped if she is a virgin.  Additionally, his statement 
implies that female protestors might falsely accuse soldiers of rape, thereby employing 
negative tropes of femininity to represent women revolutionaries as untrustworthy and 
deviant.   
Sisi is not alone in his beliefs that female protestors bear sole responsibility for 
their attacks.  Members of three different political groups – the SCAF, the Salafi Party, 	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and the Muslim Brotherhood’s political party – expressed similar beliefs about women’s 
culpability in their assaults.  In March 2013, police general and Salafi Party Board 
Member Adel Abed Maqsoud Afifi told The New York Times that “sometimes…a girl 
contributes 100 percent to her own raping when she puts herself in those conditions.”112 
Several weeks later, another member of the Salafi Party, Salah Abdel Salam, reiterated 
this opinion in Daily News Egypt: “The woman bears the offence [sic] when she chooses 
to protest in places filled with thugs.”113  Freedom and Justice Party member Reda Al-
Hefnawy agreed, saying “Women should not mingle with men during protests.”114  
 These initial discussions of the revolution’s sexual violence placed blame on the 
women assaulted.  Egypt’s political bodies only began to refrain from blaming women 
when the parties started to blame one another.  As tension between the parties increased, 
so did the use of sexual violence accusations as political tools. The SCAF, for example, 
did not go out of its way to publicly support women revolutionaries until it entered into 
conflict with the Muslim Brotherhood government. The accusatory approach was a two-
way street.  Both the SCAF and Muslim Brotherhood paint one another as baltagiyya 
organizations or illegitimate revolutionary forces, and both have linked the other with 
Mubarak’s regime by pointing out the similarities in their tactics.115  These methods 
helped tarnish the opposing party’s public image. 
 Cairo University professor Mohammed Elmasry described the anti-Muslim 
Brotherhood sentiments expressed in a June 2013 article for Jadaliyya:  	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As someone who has studied discourse for eleven years, the anti-
Brotherhood, anti-Morsi propaganda is unlike anything I have ever seen, 
primarily because news reporters and organizations–rather than political 
figures–seem to spearhead the propaganda efforts.116 
 
Most of Egypt’s media – particularly its television stations – is owned by the state.  The 
SCAF utilizes the media at its disposal to encourage public support for its interim 
government.117 State media has, on several occasions, fabricated information in order to 
instigate pro-military and anti-Brotherhood acts of violence.118  The Muslim Brotherhood 
responded to the SCAF’s accusations with their own, referring to members of the military 
as “coup thugs”: “ 
Coup forces’ brutality did not stop…On December 28, 2013, in Damietta, 
about ten women were attacked, their heads badly injured. Worse still, 
coup thugs sexually assaulted them. These days, there have been repeated 
attacks on and arrest and detention of girls and women in many provinces 
of Egypt. All these are religious, moral and social crimes completely 
condemned by our Egyptian religious oriental society that respects values 
of chastity and honor, and where women are respected, protected and held 
in the highest regard.119 
 
The Muslim Brotherhood’s twitter page, IkhwanWeb, released a similar delegitimizing 
accusation of anti-Morsi protestors in June 2013: “Video of #Tahrir mobs and thugs aka 
‘revolutionaries’ sexually assualting [sic] young foreign woman, among many others.”120 
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Although they heatedly accuse one another of perpetrating sexual violence against 
women, SCAF and the Muslim Brotherhood have taken little action to stop the violence 
itself.  This has not gone unnoticed.  As Mariam Kirollos wrote in her article, “Sexual 
Violence in Egypt: Myths and Realities”: 
Instead of investigating such crimes and holding the perpetrators 
accountable, the former presidency and ruling party have exploited the 
number of cases to deface the opposition. Some in the opposition have 
also used these cases to accuse the presidency and the Muslim 
Brotherhood of the assaults. Neither side has solid proof and both are 
instrumentalizing brutality. The Freedom and Justice Party did not limit 
itself to using the number of cases in its political bargaining. It went 
further still and blatantly violated basic media ethics by publishing the 
details of one survivor’s assault in print and online. Such ruthless use of 
women’s violated bodies as political battlefields is a repulsive pattern that 
we must refuse at all costs.121 
 
Nazra and El-Nadeem explicitly criticize this utilization of the violated female body for 
political gain.  In their joint report on sexual assault, the organizations wrote: 
We urge all political and revolutionary forces to realize that women’s 
issues are not a fleeting cause or simply a bargaining chip to be used 
against religiously-minded political opponents or others. Rather, they are a 
principal part of the revolution, of the current political ferment, and of the 
struggle for freedom in which women have played such a vital role and for 
which they have sacrificed much.122 
 
The temporary adoption of women’s rights is not the SCAF and Brotherhood’s only flaw 
with regards to gender issues.  While issuing press releases that state their support for 
women’s rights, these same parties and affiliated individuals continue to impede these 
rights.  The Muslim Brotherhood publicly refused to support the United Nations 
Commission on the Status of Women (UNCSW)’s declaration “End Violence Against 
Women,” due to its conflicts with Sharia law. One of the conflicts noted on IkhwanWeb 
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was that the declaration would permit wives to file legal charges for spousal rape.123  This 
press release called these conflicts “destructive tools meant to undermine the family as an 
important institution.”124  In addition, the press release:  
[C]all[ed] on women’s organizations to commit to their religion and 
morals of their communities and the foundations of good social like and 
not be deceived with misleading calls to decadent modernization and paths 
of subversive immorality.125 
 
Revealing a similar lack of concern for women’s issues, the SCAF’s military court 
acquitted Ahmed Adel el-Mogy, the military doctor who sexually assaulted women 
revolutionaries by performing “virginity tests” on them.  The acquittal proves the degree 
to which the SCAF is committed to combatting sexual violence against women.  The 
preoccupation with accusations and the exploitation of ambiguity regarding responsibility 
for the revolutions sexual violence problem, all in order to make those accusations, 
redirects focus away from the real issue: gender justice. This redirection directly impedes 
efforts to stop the violence and address its systemic roots. The resulting displacement of 
responsibility permits the assaults to continue, to multiply, and to grow increasingly 
violent. As Nazra and El Nadeem write, “Disagreements in public discourse concerning 
sexual harassment and violence has made it easier for these crimes to reach such an 
extreme, which is now difficult to treat with direct intervention.”126 
In an individual publication, Nazra reiterated its critique of this hypocrisy with 
fervor, stating “we will not allow our efforts to raise this issue to be exploited by any 
party that seeks to marginalize women, their role, or their right to be present at any public 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  123	  “Muslim Brotherhood Statement Denouncing UN Women Declaration for Violating Sharia Principles,” 
IkhwanWeb: The Muslim Brotherhood's Official English Web Site, March 14, 2013. Web.	  124	  Ibid.	  125	  Ibid.	  126	  “Sexual Assault and Rape in Tahrir Square.” 52.	  
 	   50	  
event.”127  Although the party in power has changed, the same disregard of women’s 
rights as a legitimate cause crucial to the nation’s success remains.  Nazra and El-
Nadeem highlight this consistency when discussing the sexual violence taking place 
under Morsi’s Muslim Brotherhood regime:  
[T]he use of sexual harassment or rape to scare the women so they do not 
participate in demonstrations is a tactic that has existed since the days of 
Mubarak and during the rule of the Supreme Council of the Armed 
Forces.128   
 
Author and activist Ahdaf Soueif points out other similarities in her book, Cairo: Memoir 
of A City Transformed, her personal account as a member of the revolution: 
In Egypt, we find that the economic ideology of the Brotherhood is not 
very different from that of the Mubarak regime; essentially a free market, 
capitalist ideology that favors the corporation over the citizen and the rich 
over the poor.129  
 
Finally, El-Nadeem published a note on its Facebook page vociferously condemning the 
patriarchal regimes and violence against women that continue to plague Egypt: 
The faces have changed, but the system is the same. Oppressive. 
Authoritarian. Dictatorial…From Mubarak to the military junta and now 
the Muslim Brotherhood, torture, and in particular sexual torture, has been 
a constant threat to Egyptian citizens.  There are several examples of this, 
from the case of Emad El Kabir under Mubarak’s regime, to Ahmed 
Rashad under the military junta of the SCAF and the case of Ayman 
Mehanna under the rule of the Brotherhood.  From the sexual assault of 
women protesters and journalists under Mubarak in 2005, to SCAF’s use 
of so-called “virginity testing” on detained activists in March 2011, to the 
more recent organized sexual assault on Yasmin El Baramawy and others 
in places of protest under the Brotherhood, organized sexual torture 
continues to be used by the state as a weapon against its opponents.130  
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Egypt’s primary political parties may not organize to prevent sexual violence, but 
its feminist organizations certainly do.  A number of anti-harassment groups have 
organized around one goal: find women being assaulted, help them escape their attackers, 
and aid them in seeming medical attention.  Among these organizations are Operation 
Anti-Sexual Harassment (OpAntiSH), Tahrir Bodyguard, and Shoft Taharosh (I Saw 
Harassment).  They all employ similar tactics.  Nada Abdel Azim, a representative of 
Shoft Taharosh, described its methods to Al-Tahrir Newspaper: 
[We] are divided into safety, confrontation, and follow-up teams. 
Coordination among groups takes place through an operation room that 
receives calls and directs groups to the areas where the harassment is 
taking place so they can intervene and save the girls. A group encircles the 
harassers and pushes them away, another creates a safe alley for the girl to 
pass through, and she is then received by the third group which provides 
her with clothes and first aid, if needed.131 
 
Although these groups are often criticized for encouraging survivors to speak publicly 
about their assaults – one woman included a disclaimer in her testimony, saying “I know 
that many will not like that I wrote this about Tahrir square thinking I am trying to 
vandalize the image of the Egyptian revolution”132 – Julie Shayne explains in The 
Revolution Question that women’s movements are not responsible for dividing or 
undermining revolutions in a gendered way.  
[W]omen demonstrate the potential to be precisely the opposite of 
divisive, despite the myopic visions of male leftists who fragment 
movements by pushing women and their potential supporters away.133 
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Shayne’s argument exposes how the hypocrisy of these political and revolutionary 
factions undermines and weakens not only the cause of women’s rights, but also the 
revolution’s nationalist cause, for one affects the other.  The revolution, rooted in 
patriarchal social structures, is not a hospitable place for women.  Concern for women’s 
safety is not enough to make a revolution egalitarian and thereby successful.  It is 
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CHAPTER 3: Oriental Representations of Gender in the Revolution 
 
The previous chapter examined the treatment of gender within Egyptian urban 
society, the revolution, and Egyptian political discourse.  This chapter conversely 
examines the treatment of gender in foreign coverage and commentary on Egypt and the 
revolution, paying specific attention to what I term neoliberal orientalism.    
On November 20th, 2013, then U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry made the 
following statement in his speech at the Overseas Security Advisory Council's 28th 
Annual Briefing: 
[T]hose kids in Tahrir Square, they were not motivated by any religion or 
ideology. They were motivated by what they saw through this 
interconnected world, and they wanted a piece of the opportunity and a 
chance to get an education and have a job and have a future, and not have 
a corrupt government that deprived them of all of that and more. And they 
tweeted their ways and Facetimed their ways and talked to each other, and 
that’s what drove that revolution.134 
 
Kerry’s point was that the protests in Tahrir Square were unrelated to the extremist or 
fundamentalist attitudes typically associated with the Middle East and North Africa; that 
on the contrary, they were inspired by global revolutions and a strong desire for better life 
and governance.  In an attempt to support the Egyptian Revolution, Kerry does not 
acknowledge the protesters’ individual belief systems, claiming that they were driven not 
by their own ideologies, but by models set elsewhere in the world.  Kerry implies that the 
revolution was born out of mimicry.  At first glance, this is not necessarily symptomatic 
of neoliberalism, as Kerry focuses on the large-scale motivations rather than personal 
ones.  But his reference to the protestors as “kids” accomplishes exactly what a neoliberal 	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preoccupation with individual problems does: it trivializes their collective efforts. This 
trivialization separates the revolutionaries’ demands from the grave systemic problems 
against which they protest.  Additionally, while the majority of protests have been 
dominated by youth, “these kids” are young men and women, not children.  In 
Orientalism, Said suggests that Kerry’s outlook is not an anomaly: 
The Oriental is imagined to feel his world threatened by a superior 
civilization; yet his motives are impelled, not by some positive desire for 
freedom, political independence, or cultural achievement on their own 
terms, but instead by rancor or jealous malice.135 
 
Kerry’s description of the Egyptian “kids” and their desire for the opportunity, 
education, job, and future – logical demands – counters Said’s explanation of orientalist 
views of “the Oriental.” Kerry’s words can be interpreted as the “positive desire” that 
Said claims is forbidden to “the Oriental.”  Kerry’s education is Said’s freedom; Kerry’s 
opportunity, Said’s political independence; Kerry’s job and future, Said’s cultural 
achievement.  Kerry both negates and embodies aspects of orientalism.  Does this mean 
that Kerry did not employ orientalist tropes in his speech? No. Despite the fact that he 
acknowledged the protesters’ logical demands, he arguably did not present these demands 
as if they are on the protesters’ “own terms.”  He prefaced the opportunity-education-job-
future explanation by stating that the motivation came from outside of Egypt.  Moreover, 
his suggestion that belief in a citizen’s right to opportunity, education, job, and future is 
not an ideology hints at a perceived crudeness of the protests.  Divorcing the demands 
that he himself said the Tahrir protesters made from the notion of a broader ideology 
minimizes them.  It turns the narrative of this national movement and revolution into one 
of simple folk – simple kids – demanding their basic rights.  Perhaps when Kerry said, 	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“they were not motivated by any religion or ideology,” he specifically meant religious or 
fundamentalist ideology.  If so, his conflation of religion and ideology when held by 
Muslim people insinuates that their religion is their primary attribute.  Rather than 
emphasizing political or social ideologies, Kerry references religion, setting up the 
protesters in opposition to his invoked image of Islamic terrorists.  His description of the 
protesters affirms that, while Other, they are on a linear path towards Westernization.  
 Orientalist beliefs can be found in most forms of media – from public speeches by 
the Secretary of State, reputable newspaper articles, and scholarly works from academics 
to less prestigious or thoroughly vetted outlets like The New York Post and online blogs.  
Said comments on this in his 2003 preface to Orientalism: 
Accompanying such warmongering expertise have been the omnipresent 
CNNs and Fox News Channels of this world, plus myriad numbers of 
evangelical and right-wing radio hosts, plus innumerable tabloids and even 
middlebrow journals, all of them recycling the same unverifiable fictions 
and vast generalizations so as to stir up “America” against the foreign 
devil.136   
Said points to intentionally negative coverage of “the Orient,” particularly in negative 
coverage from right wing and Republican-leaning sources.  However, as Kerry’s speech 
demonstrates, orientalism can manifest itself just as strongly when the coverage is 
complimentary and the commentators Democrats.  A short piece from April 2011 entitled 
“Demonstrate Like an Egyptian” by WNYC’s Sarah Abdurrahman, host of On the Media 
in Cairo.  The title alone – a reference to a 1986 hit pop song, “Walk Like an Egyptian,” 
which pokes fun at the poses depicted in famous hieroglyphics – illustrates that these 
tropes are everywhere and they continue to stand the test of time. After describing the 
makeshift market established in Tahrir Square, Abdurrahman writes:  	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To look at all this, you would think they were professionals, accustomed 
to congregating in such massive groups calling for change. But then you 
have to remind yourself: they are not professionals. This is new for them. 
What we take so for granted in the U.S., they have only just gained, and 
they cherish every chance they get.137 
 
Abdurrahman’s comment, while complimentary of the protesters’ organization and 
passion, is not dissimilar from Kerry’s praise of “those kids in Tahrir Square.”  Both 
Kerry and Abdurrahman emphasize the fact that the protesters are only now 
accomplishing that which Westerners have been doing for years.  But Egypt did not 
suddenly discover the art of protest.  Ahdaf Soueif alludes to Egypt’s long history of 
public protests and resistance in Cairo.  She feels pride watching Egypt’s youth settle in 
Tahrir and accomplish what “the older revolutionaries…have been trying [to do] since 
’72.”138 While the revolution made possible protests and political activism on a greater 
scale than before, it did not prompt the first mass protests ever to take place in the 
country.  In an attempt to commend Egyptian revolutionaries for their activism and 
celebrate the protests as a new age of commonality between polarized East and West, 
Kerry and Abdurrahman render prior protests – some of which were actively anti-United 
States – invisible.    
Kerry and Abdurrahman’s respective words choices matter precisely because they 
are unexpected.  Kerry is a member of the Democratic Party; he is a liberal politician.  
Abdurrahman reports for National Public Radio on WNYC, a radio station that tends to 
lean left.  They are not the people one pictures when considering contemporary displays 
of racism.  On the contrary, they are progressive public figures.  Kerry and Abdurrahman 
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are surprising offenders, and the fact that they come as a surprise is symptomatic of 
institutionalized neoliberal orientalism.   
Orientalist tropes are used to suit the Global North’s needs and goals at a given 
time.  In colonized Egypt, the colonial state needed to maintain its power.  Consequently, 
members of the effendi class who sought to obtain the same education as their colonizers, 
thereby threatening the British colonial state’s superiority, were depicted as conniving, 
sneaky, and small, effectively minimizing their threat.  Contemporarily, the neoliberal 
United States is intent on “exporting American values,” as Chomsky wrote, and 
maintaining its influence in Egypt.139  As a result, the revolutionaries conceived of as pro-
American through their demands for political and social change are depicted positively.  
The conniving effendi manner is reattributed to Mubarak’s administration, while the 
revolutionaries adopt the “rough” but charming nature of the colonially depicted rural 
masculinities.   
This demonstrates that orientalism’s prominence even when the goal is to 
promote support, solidarity or identification with the “Other,” or rather; with the “Other-
who-Emulates-Us,” a patronizing trajectory that locates objective modernity in Western 
culture.  This is particularly the case in feminist orientalism.  
 
 
Feminist Orientalism  
 Charlotte Webber presents the problems with feminist orientalism in her 2001 
essay “Unveiling Scheherazade: Feminist Orientalism in the International Alliance of 
Women. 1911-1950.”  As Weber explains: 
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Ultimately, the belief of Western feminists in the superiority of European 
culture proved stronger than their belief in “global sisterhood.” Their 
conviction that they needed to “help” their more oppressed sisters 
reflected an a priori assumption that women’s seclusion signified their 
total helplessness, blinding them to whatever power and authority Middle 
Eastern women did possess.140     
 
Weber concludes that, “Despite their sympathy for, and occasional identification with 
their Middle Eastern sisters, Western feminists never regarded them as equals.”141  
Weber’s piece discusses the first wave Western feminist movement. While the ideologies 
of the more contemporary third wave of the movement have shifted, the determination of 
oppression on occidental terms has not, even when third wavers attempt to identify with 
what they perceive to be empowering. 
On December 29, 2011, Sally Quinn, a journalist at the Washington Post, wrote 
an op-ed entitled “The Blue Bra Revolution.”  Many news outlets covered the footage of 
a young woman beaten by Egyptian Riot Police but Quinn’s piece is exemplary for 
several reasons.  Quinn’s article attempts to create an empowering narrative around this 
unidentified woman, however, the narrative she uses is based on the same “a priori 
assumption[s]” that Weber describes in “Unveiling Scheherazade.”  Quinn’s piece 
unintentionally objectifies the female protester, uses her as a political tool, reduces her to 
a symbol, all of which she justifies with feminist orientalism.  Quinn’s article is a 
Washington Post blog post, and she quickly discloses the nature of her subjectivity.  The 
post is less about the woman herself and more about Quinn’s interpretation of the woman 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  140	  Charlotte Weber, "Unveiling Scheherazade: Feminist Orientalism in the International Alliance of 
Women. 1911-1950," Feminist Studies 27 no.1 (2001): 125-57. 129.	  141	  Ibid. 151. 
 	   59	  
and her undergarments.  The first two lines of the article read: “The blue bra. That’s what 
did it for me.”142  
Quinn adapts the experience of this unidentified Egyptian woman – described in 
Egyptian media as “Tahrir Girl” – into a third wave feminist, sex-positive one.  She 
writes, “I think what got to me was that she was wearing this gorgeous, sexy bright blue 
bra. Underneath her abaya.”143  Quinn characterizes the bra as “sexy,” and then reduces 
this woman to her bra.  It becomes the single most important thing about her, and since it 
is a sexualized object, sex becomes her primary feature.  In attempting to empower this 
woman through her interpretation of the woman’s sexuality, Quinn imposes sexuality as 
identity on the “girl in the blue bra.”  This imposition of sexuality is just as oppressive as 
the prohibition of sexuality that Quinn condemns; both the imposition and prohibition rob 
an individual of agency and choice over her body.  
Quinn juxtaposes the woman’s abaya – a loose robe that can be paired with a 
headscarf or face covering worn by many Muslim women in North Africa – with the blue 
bra, as if the two are inherently contradictory.  Having already sexualized the bra, Quinn 
invokes the image of a decidedly asexual Muslim femininity.  She describes the blue bra 
as “shocking” and “unexpected,” juxtaposing to what might be a normal pairing of 
underwear and clothing.  The implicit message in her “shock” is that Muslim women 
have no sexuality, that they cannot be sexy, at least not in the ways with which Quinn 
associates sexuality.   
Yet this bra could also be completely unattached to sexuality.  It might simply be 
a bra. Quinn interprets this differently, claiming, “this person covered from head to toe 	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demonstrated her beliefs through her choice of underwear.”144  Quinn’s appropriation of 
the bra and her imposition of its sexuality ignores this woman’s identity and experiences. 
Then Quinn speaks for the woman:  
The blue bra said what I imagine her to be feeling: “I may be oppressed. I 
may not have rights. I may have to cover up my body and face. But you 
cannot destroy my womanhood. You can’t rob me of my femininity. You 
can’t take away my power.”145 
 
In this narrative, the woman in question is an oppressed object.  She is not 
oppressed because riot police are beating her, but because she “has” to wear an abaya.  
Quinn disregards the fact that this woman might choose to wear the abaya and choose to 
cover herself.  The woman’s abaya could be an expression of her womanhood and her 
femininity.  Quinn presents the bra – an article of clothing with which western feminists 
might be able to identify – as a powerful and mystical object, even calling it a “talisman 
or amulet” (a comparison evocative of classical romanticized orientalism) in a follow-up 
post.146  The abaya, on the other hand, represents this woman’s oppression.  Quinn takes 
one moment within a complex and multilayered revolution and simplistically classifies it 
as another case of Muslim women as victims of Brown Male Misogyny.  Not only has 
she coopted this woman’s body and feelings, now she coopts her revolutionary intentions.  
We cannot know what this woman was protesting.  Given the date of this protest – 
December 17, 2011 – it was more likely against the Egyptian military’s continued control 
of the state and increased violence against civilians, not the Muslim Brotherhood, as 
Quinn implies.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  144	  Ibid. 145	  Ibid. 146	  Sally Quinn, “The Power of a Woman,” Washington Post, January 6, 2012.	  
 	   61	  
Following this appropriation of the woman’s identity and personality, Quinn 
exports the blue bra.  She takes the blue bra and applies it to other situations of female 
oppression – almost exclusively in the Middle East (the one exception being the United 
States Military) – as a symbol of empowerment.  Her focus on Middle Eastern conflicts 
reinforces the idea that Arab countries are populated with violent and oppressive 
patriarchies nonexistent in Western civil society.  With each example of a woman or 
group of women confronting patriarchy, Quinn states, “she should wear a blue bra.”147  
Quinn elaborates on the power of the blue bra with a call to arms: 
It’s time for all women to own the blue bra, either a real one or one of the 
spirit. Let’s not allow that young woman in Egypt to have been beaten, 
stripped and exposed in vain. Let us make her humiliation our triumph.148 
 
She cites the case of a friend of hers, a successful professional woman who always wears 
“pastel lace underwear” under her pantsuits.149  Quinn’s friend says doing this gives her a 
“feeling of confidence and power.”  Yet while both Quinn’s friend and the female 
protester are wearing socially accepted and expected outer garments, Quinn only knows 
the motivation regarding undergarments for the former. Quinn does not know whether or 
not the protester wore her blue bra to bring her “confidence and power.”150 Quinn’s 
anecdote about her friend seems to imply that the key to liberation for Muslim women is 
the donning of Western feminine lingerie and the embracing of their female sexualities.  
Intentional or not, this value judgment reemphasizes the power in traditional, Western 
femininity.  At the end of the piece, Quinn takes her advocacy for the blue bra further: 
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The great thing about it is that when women go into the workplace, or the 
public square, or anywhere else, the men are always going to wonder, does 
she have on the blue bra? Let the answer always be yes.151 
 
For Quinn, the endgame of this type of empowerment appears to involve a 
heteronormative “boys will be boys” culture in which men constantly wonder about the 
underwear the women around them are wearing.  The literal interpretation of Quinn’s 
argument is strange, but even her figurative point is troubling.  A society in which 
women carry their feminism and power around like a mischievous secret, a culture in 
which men can only speculate as to whether women are empowered, sparks Quinn’s 
approval. Neither of these is conducive to the advancement of gender equality, for neither 
accommodates overt, unabashed feminism and empowerment.  Social gender equality 
will not come about if feminism and empowerment are kept quietly to oneself, if their 
existence is uncertain. Empowerment and feminism must be loud and visible if gender 
equality is to be achieved. Quinn’s argument falls regrettably short of these requirements 
because her figurative point only involves the claim and intent of feminist activism. It 
provides no direction for action and effect. 
Quinn’s representation of the woman likely did not stem from a conscious desire 
to appropriate her experience.  Quinn truly seems to believe her interpretation of the 
video. In this way, her piece is symptomatic of orientalist culture.  She does not see her 
piece as coopting another woman’s experience, because orientalism has led her to believe 
that she can write another person’s – a brown person’s – narrative.  It is her version of 
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Gayatri Spivak’s ironic observation of “White men saving brown women from brown 
men.”152   
As is the case with many works of orientalism, Quinn’s piece tells us more about 
the orientalist culture in which she lives than it does about Egyptian culture or the culture 
of the revolution.153  According to Said, orientalism is so deeply imbedded within 
occidental culture that many orientalists are unaware of its influence.  Contemporary 
orientalism is not intentionally violent or oppressive.  Its invisibility to those utilizing it is 
part of what makes it so dangerous.  Said explains this in his discussion of early twentieth 
century British orientalists Arthur James Balfour and Lord Cromer: 
That Balfour and Cromer… could strip humanity down to such ruthless 
cultural and racial essences was not at all an indication of their particular 
viciousness. Rather it was an indication of how streamlined a general 
doctrine had become by the time they put it to use – how streamlined and 
effective.154 
 
Quinn’s piece, similarly, is in no way an “indication of [her] particular viciousness.”  
Instead, it reveals orientalism’s normativity.  Quinn’s piece tells us nothing about the 
Egyptian revolution.  It is a personal narrative, one that exposes one of the many ways in 
which orientalism is concealed: under the guise of feminism.  Orientalism centers on the 
Self and definition of the Self in opposition to the Other; in the Blue Bra blog post, Quinn 
defines feminist “progress” as sexual positivism.  She expresses this in opposition to what 
she perceives as oppressive Islamic culture.  Like Kerry, she seems fond of what she 
perceives as Egyptian youth finally “catching up.”  And like Kerry’s encouragement of 
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the protestors, Quinn’s sexually progressive advocacy for this woman nearly obscures the 
neoliberal orientalism ingrained within.   
Quinn says little about the violence committed against this woman, and even less 
about the fact that her clothes were torn off by riot police.  Instead, she projects her 
personal interpretation of empowerment onto the woman.  Admirable as her refusal to 
victimize the protester may be, Quinn tries so hard to ascribe some version of “sex-
positivity” onto this beating that she overlooks the context of the situation.  Both 
victimization and assumed sexual empowerment label and feminize this woman. They do 
so in different ways but are equally disempowering in that they rob the woman of her 
right to her own narrative.  Quinn admits that this case intrigues her because of the bra – 
again, trivializing this woman with one sexualized object. She does not say a word about 
the man who is beaten alongside the woman in the video footage.  This male protestor is 
curled on the ground in fetal position as a riot policeman repeatedly stomps on him with 
seemingly equal violence to that used against the woman.  But he is a man, and violence 
committed by men against men is not as shocking as violence against women, 
particularly violence against a half-dressed woman.  For Quinn, the violence seems 
nearly irrelevant. The sex is what captures her attention.  
Quinn’s pieces are an extreme example of orientalist media.  While her pieces are 
blog posts, and therefore not held to the same standards and requirements as news 
articles, they are blog posts on the Washington Post, a reputable newspaper.  That the 
Washington Post chose to publish this type of opinion piece demonstrates how easy it is 
for more subtle forms of orientalism to be published in a respectable piece of journalism.  
Quinn’s piece is valuable in that it illustrates a twinning of feminist and orientalist 
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agendas.  The extremity of her two pieces will perhaps make it easier to recognize less 
palpable uses of these tropes.  When they appear in news articles, these understated 
applications of neoliberal orientalist tropes are far more dangerous than are those of 
Quinn. 
Most news outlets that reported this woman’s beating fail to mention the male 
protester by her side.  Their coverage, while not as sensationalized as Quinn’s, still does 
not escape orientalist and gendered tropes. CNN, the New York Times, and NPR refer to 
this woman as a “girl.”155  The Guardian, Al Jazeera, The Atlantic, and the Washington 
Post depict her as an adult woman.156  The female protester’s identity is largely 
characterized as “the blue bra girl” or “the girl in the blue bra” in mainstream media. 
Ahdaf Soueif’s report for The Guardian is one exception, as it identifies the woman not 
by her bra, but instead calls her “the young woman in the blue jeans.”157  
Although The Guardian avoids titling this woman in accordance with her 
undergarments, Soueif’s piece is littered with references to this woman’s femininity and 
helplessness.  Soueif introduces us to the woman with a physical description. “The 
woman is young, and slim, and fair.”158  While this is not necessarily a sexualized 
description, it emphasizes this woman’s femininity.  She is young, thin, and has light 	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skin.  Soueif continues with this theme, suggesting that the woman is “unresisting – 
maybe she’s fainted” and points out her “bare delicate arms.”159 Soueif employs this 
woman’s femininity to demonstrate the Egyptian military’s use of violence against 
protesters.  By emphasizing the woman’s classic femininity – her frail helplessness – 
Soueif highlights the police’s indiscriminate violence against even the “weakest” 
protesters.  Quinn and Soueif utilize gendered stereotypes to describe the beating of a 
female protester in order to advance a larger point in keeping with their respective 
narratives of choice.  For Quinn, the point seems to be identifying Islamic patriarchy, and 
the countervailing seeds of female sexual empowerment latent in Egyptian society.  For 
Soueif, it seems to be the brutality of the Egyptian riot police.  In both cases, the female 
body is feminized and reappropriated to serve a particular narrative.  
The gendered and racialized tropes that Quinn and Soueif employ are not new, 
nor are they restricted to Egypt.  On the contrary, the representations of and emphasis on 
gender in war and revolution are part of a long lineage of orientalist depictions of Middle 
Eastern people and conflicts.  Foreign analyses and reports of conflicts in the global 
south, in an attempt to disassociate the West from violence and project that violence onto 
the “Other,” often utilize the notion of “a culture of violence” to explain away complex 
conflicts.  Simon Springer explains this projection of violence onto the “Other” in his 
essay, “Culture of Violence or Violent Orientalism? Neoliberalism and Imagining the 
‘Savage Other’ in Post-Transitional Cambodia.”  Springer writes: 
[T]he culture of violence thesis simplistically reduces this [the context of 
the conflict] to a linear relationship where ‘culture’ alone is viewed as the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  159	  Ibid.	  
 	   67	  
basis for violence in Cambodian society…the culture of violence thesis 
is…a sweeping caricature shot through with Orientalist imaginaries.160   
 
Springer goes on to explain that orientalism is “a form of paranoia that feeds on 
cartographies of fear by producing ‘our’ own world negatively through the construction 
of a perverse ‘other.’”161  That is, when the West positively (actively) constructs the 
“Savage Other,” it implicitly defines itself in the “negative” space.  The use of 
orientalism and othering is not restricted to Eastern Asia.  Springer adds, “in the context 
of the ‘war on terror,’ ‘African,’ ‘Asian’ and ‘Islamic’ cultures are said to be inherently 
violent.”162  This can be seen in coverage of the Egyptian revolution.  Media tends to 
discuss Egypt, a North African and predominantly Islamic country, with an orientalist 
framework.163   
Quinn demonstrates this by displacing the repression of women onto Egyptian 
culture.  It is symptomatic of the Other and therefore not a Western problem.  This is the 
very colonization of experience that Chandra Mohanty discusses in her essay, “Under 
Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourse.”  The Western feminist 
“production of this ‘third-world difference’” and “discursive homogenization” that 
Mohanty describes stems from the same oppositional and othering gaze as orientalism.164 
Mohanty explains these terms further, critiquing the “image of an ‘average third-world 
woman.’”  According to Mohanty,  	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[The] average third-world woman leads an essentially truncated life based 
on her feminine gender (read: sexually constrained) and being ‘third 
world’ (read: ignorant, poor, uneducated, tradition-bound, religious, 
domesticated family-oriented, victimized, etc.). This…is in contrast to the 
(implicit) self-representation of western women as educated, modern, as 
having control over their own bodies and sexualities and the ‘freedom’ to 
make their own decisions.165 
 
Interestingly, Quinn, while placing herself in opposition to the woman in the blue bra 
with her orientalist depiction of the woman’s circumstances, also extends her image of 
Western feminism to this woman.  Quinn still projects an image, but rather than 
projecting an oppositional one, she projects a mirror of herself and her feminism.  Her 
projection serves the same function as an oppositional image would – the assertion of her 
liberated Western woman-ness of which Mohanty writes – but it takes a neoliberal 
approach, claiming to empower when in actuality, it renders the woman invisible, 
effectively rendering the space she occupies fair game for discursive manipulation.  As 
Mohanty explains, “western feminists alone become the true ‘subjects’ of this counter-
history [or in this case, mirror-history].  Third-world women, on the other hand, never 
rise above the debilitating generality of their ‘object’ status.”166  At the very core of 
representations like Quinn’s is what Mohanty aptly terms “ethnocentric universality.”167 
 The attempt to reproduce one’s version of feminism through one’s perception of 
Muslim women demonstrates the deep link between orientalist analyses and the 
utilization of essentialized gender roles in discussions – both scholarly and within media 
– of Global South conflicts, namely, the Egyptian revolution.  Mohanty describes the 
victimizing representation of Muslim women, writing, “all Arab and Muslim women 
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[are] seen to constitute a homogenous oppressed group…Arabs and Muslims, it appears, 
don’t change at all.168  
Again, these gendered representations of women in conflict are part of a long 
tradition of generating narratives that justify international intervention. In her 2004 
article, “Media Images of Women During War: Vehicles of Patriarchy’s Agenda?” Adhis 
Chetty argues, “The circumstances of war forcefully highlight human vulnerability, but 
the media’s presentation of this vulnerability tends to be gendered.”169 Women are hyper-
feminized to enhance their helplessness.  The cry to save “women and children” makes 
clear who the truly weak parties are (and equates women with children). Chetty also 
writes: “women and children are still used as pawns by the media to perpetuate the 
agendas of hegemonic forces in society.”170  The media manipulation and use of a 
victimized figure that Chetty describes in her article here is identical to Soueif’s 
treatment of the “young woman in the blue jeans.” While one depiction of a sympathetic 
character might not make a liberal Western audience slightly more inclined to support 
international intervention, repeated exposure to these images and representations can. The 
individuals producing these representations participate – wittingly or unwittingly – in the 
neoliberal orientalist project. Soueif, an Egyptian feminist nationalist who opposes 
American intervention likely did not intend to perpetuate neoliberal orientalism.  Soueif, 
perhaps even more so than Kerry and Abdurrahman, is an unexpected offender. Her 
reproduction of orientalist imagery demonstrates yet again, its invisibly widespread 
influence. 	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 Tropes of femininity are often accompanied by tropes of oppositional masculinity. 
In the case of Soueif and the “young woman in the blue jeans,” the oppositional 
masculinity at play is the Egyptian military’s brute force and violence against protesters.  
For Quinn, it is the threat of Islamist male control over women’s bodies.  However, 
oriental masculine and feminine tropes are not merely placed in opposition to each other.  
They are also placed in opposition to the West.  Just as orientalized femininity can give 
the false assurance that gender inequality and violence against women are afflictions of 
the “Other,” orientalized masculinity allows for the overall assertion of Western civilized 
society.  As Paul Amar asserts in “Middle East Masculinity Studies: Discourses of ‘Men 
in Crisis,’ Industries of Gender in Revolution:” 
Orientalism was a mask behind which or through which more 
revolutionary and oppositional subjects could be constituted and through 
which the eroticized gaze of the colonizer could be subverted and 
recoded.171 
The following section explores this intersection of orientalist “recoding” with 
constructions of masculinity. 
 
 
Orientalized Masculinities  
In “Middle East Masculinity Studies: Discourses of ‘Men in Crisis,’ Industries of 
Gender in Revolution,” Amar questions the consistent deployment of a “version of 
masculinity studies to explain violence in and from the Middle East.”172  Amar points to a 
longstanding literary, journalistic, media, and scholarly tradition of conflating violence 
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not only with maleness,173 but also with racialized maleness – in this case, a “racialized 
Middle Eastern maleness.”174  While there are many other tropes of oriental 
masculinities, the dominant gendered and orientalist narratives of the revolution link 
oriental masculinity to misogyny and violence.  Relics of the British colonial construction 
of effendi masculinities remain, as was mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, but are 
less prominent.  This section will focus primarily on violent representations of oriental 
masculinities because they are most frequently deployed in Western news and 
commentary on the Egyptian revolution. 
Most of the pieces written about the woman beaten by riot police focus on the 
woman’s femininity.  However, an article in The Atlantic by Max Fisher, entitled “A 
Photo That Encapsulates the Horror of Egypt’s Crackdown,” emphasizes instead the 
police’s brutal masculinity.175  “[T]here is something especially barbaric about this 
photo,” Fisher writes.  His use of the word “barbaric” denotes uncivilized behavior.  Said 
uses this word periodically throughout Orientalism as an example of the ways in which 
early orientalists viewed the Oriental Other.  As he writes towards the beginning of the 
book, “Islam [came] to symbolize terror, devastation, the demonic, hordes of hated 
barbarians.”176  Fisher’s use of the word “barbaric” cannot be taken in isolation from the 
legacy of the association between Islam and “the barbaric.”  It matters little if Fisher did 
or did not use this word in order to assert his own identity as civilized, even 
unconsciously. What matters is the effect his words have. Words hold power, particularly 	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when they are words and identities that have been racially charged for centuries. Fisher’s 
use of oriental tropes makes him complicit in the perpetuation of orientalism.  
In Orientalist traditions, brown, particularly Muslim, masculinities are presented 
as oppositional to Western masculinities.  Islamic Studies scholar, Amanullah De Sondy, 
implicates Edward Said in this tradition in his book, The Crisis of Islamic Masculinities: 
Studies that used Said’s Orientalism as a key research method tend to 
strengthen the divide between the ‘East’ and the ‘West’ using a 
postmodern, postcolonial argument to create some form of legitimacy.177   
 
De Sondy adds that constructions of Muslim masculinities are stripped of their 
complexities and pluralities not only when placed in opposition to Western masculinities, 
but also when examined in isolation. “Discussions surrounding Muslim men are,” De 
Sony writes, “limited to essentialized forms of masculinity – either ideal or reviled, but 
usually always relating to an Islamic patriarchal society.”178 Indeed, the image of 
oppressive Islamic patriarchy is central to constructions of oriental masculinities. 
However, representations of Islamic patriarchy come in a variety of forms, some 
more heavily affiliated with violence than others.  Mohanty critiques Fran Hosken’s 1981 
piece, “Female Genital Mutilation and Human Rights,” which centers on female genital 
cutting in Africa and the Middle East.  Mohanty cites Hosken, saying “‘male sexual 
politics’ in Africa and around the world ‘share the same political goal: to assure female 
dependence and subservience by any and all means.’”179  One of Hosken’s particularly 
loaded statements declares that the goal of female genital cutting is ‘to mutilate the sexual 
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pleasure and satisfaction of woman.”180  As Mohanty points out, this depiction posits the 
“African Male” as brutish, sexually controlling savage.  Similarly, Said cites nineteenth 
century French writer Chateaubriand’s description of the “Oriental Arab” as “civilized 
man fallen into a savage state.”181  Interestingly, the darker, black male figure is 
permanently savage, whereas the brown male figure was once civilized – the proof is in 
Ancient Egypt – but has “fallen” into savagery.  This suggests a spectrum of savagery 
based on color.  Black Africa, then, is far more foreign and impossible to identify with 
than Arab, Brown Africa. Anticolonial activist and writer Frantz Fanon hints at this 
spectrum in Black Skin, White Masks, writing, “the more the black Antillean assimilates 
the French language, the whiter he gets – i.e., the closer he comes to becoming a true 
human being.”182  Hence, the blacker the subject is, the less human, and the whiter the 
subject, the more human. 
In “Middle East Masculinity Studies” Paul Amar deconstructs the ways in which 
the media has further linked violence with Middle Eastern masculinity.  While 
masculinities and violence are often paired together, they are not synonymous with one 
another, nor is their pairing exclusive to the Middle East or North Africa. Yet the binary 
opposition between Occident and Orient, civilized and savage, displaces onto brown 
cultures the cross-cultural tendency towards the promotion of violent masculinities.  If 	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violent masculinity is an oriental characteristic, it cannot be a problem afflicting the 
West, because Western subjectivity relies upon being the anti-oriental.  Gayatri Spivak’s 
observational phrase, “white men saving brown women from brown men,” is a useful 
framework to examine the West’s displacement of violence onto the oriental subject.  In 
this framework, “brown men,” (the oriental male subject) are violent and oppressive 
forces that “white men” (the West) must oppose.  The presence of “brown women” (the 
oriental female subject) provides the justification for this opposition, coloring the oriental 
male from whom they must be saved as “bad,” and the Western ‘savior’ as “good.”  This 
Occident-Orient binary, which labels the West “good,” mandates that the West cannot be 
“bad,” and is therefore devoid of the violence and oppression belonging to the “bad” 
oriental subject.  Amar rephrases Spivak’s expression as “the rescue or cultivation of 
securitized human subjects, particularly those of sexualized gender and racialized 
class.”183 The displacement of violent masculinities goes hand-in-hand with the 
displacement of gender inequality discussed in the previous section.   
The displacement of violence onto an oppositional masculinity is reproduced most 
noticeably in international military conflicts, especially when enemy models of 
masculinity are racially distinctive from one another. Feminist philosopher Sara Ruddick 
explains this in her essay, “Notes Towards a Feminist Peace Politics.” 
Typically, masculinities are divided between the enemy and “our troops.” 
“We” are the just warrior-protectors. By contrast, a particularly malignant 
form of swaggering masculinity – a criminal, sexualized aggression – is 
attributed to the enemy. When enemy males are racialized predators from 
whom innocent countries or women-and-children need protection, they 
become killable killers, ready to be burned and buried in their trenches.184 
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Ruddick writes that militaries deliberately instill the concept of a racialized enemy’s 
violent masculinity in order to “spur fighting.”185  The attribution of violence to the 
Othered masculinity justifies any and all military action “our troops” might take.  In this 
dichotomy of masculinity, Western “warrior-protectors” are not simply blameless for acts 
of violence – they are incapable of enacting the “criminalized, sexual aggression” 
ascribed to their enemies.  Consequently, criminal or sexual violence are not pervasive 
problems in the West. Like their perpetrators, these problems are distinctly “Other.”   
This displacement is also apparent in Western descriptions of the sexual violence 
in the Egyptian revolution.  As I briefly noted in Chapter 2, the mass assaults within 
protests likely garnered more international attention than the “virginity tests” because 
white Western women were attacked as well.  The media surrounding CBS reporter Lara 
Logan’s assault demonstrates the sensationalized ways in which these assaults are 
reported, and their heavy reliance on Orientalist tropes of masculinity.  Logan, a South 
African-born white and blond woman was assaulted on February 11, 2011, the very day 
that Mubarak relinquished his presidency.  Logan was reporting on the public jubilation 
when she was separated from her crew and attacked by male protesters using nearly 
identical tactics to the ones explained in Chapter 2.  Eventually a group of female 
protestors enveloped Logan, bringing her to the safety of then-nonviolent military 
members.  This assault provided ready material for orientalist tropes of savage brown 
men lusting after civilized white women.  These tropes appeared in many different media 
reports and accounts of Logan’s assault, but are most identifiable in The New York Post’s 
version.  On February 16, 2011, the day Logan was released from the hospital, The New 
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York Post’s front page held a photo of Logan with male Egyptian protestors behind her.  
Its headline reads “ANIMALS.”186  The following day, February 17, the Post’s front page 
held the same picture, this time with the headline: “White House tells Egypt…FIND THE 
BEASTS.”187  These two headlines dehumanize Logan’s attackers, reducing them to 
savage animals and reinforcing the representation of violent (brown) masculinities.   
The media used similar representations when reporting on other Western 
women’s assaults, as did the survivors themselves.  Natasha Smith, a young British 
journalist visiting Cairo in the summer of 2012 in hopes of making a documentary about 
the revolution, also employed these representations.  Smith was attacked n the same 
fashion as Logan and the anonymous Egyptian women whose testimonies were discussed 
in Chapter 2.  In her blog post describing the assault, Smith writes “Men began to rip off 
my clothes. I was stripped naked. Their insatiable appetite to hurt me heightened. These 
men, hundreds of them, had turned from humans to animals.”188 Smith continues: “All I 
could see was leering faces, more and more faces sneering and jeering as I was tossed 
around like fresh meat among starving lions.”189 Smith’s later statement about the rumor 
instigating her attack exhibits her explicit use of words denoting ethnicity. “But if that 
was the case, [if rumors had been spread and people believed that she was a foreign spy] 
it was only really used as a pretext, an excuse, to molest and violate a blonde young 
Western girl.”190  These comments reiterate the orientalist trope of brown men coveting 	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white women’s bodies.  Although Smith was simply relaying her testimony and 
describing her personal experience, the words she chose for this description are the same 
words The New York Post used, the same words that have been used for centuries when 
describing men of color. This further demonstrates that how ingrained the representations 
are in the Western social world; even when expressing something in our own words, we 
can never truly use words that belong to us.  Language has a history, and words are laden 
with hegemonic associations.  This is the inescapable nature of orientalism.   
 The focus on gender not only allows for the displacement of societal problems. It 
also occludes the complexities of the conflicts and revolutions onto which the problems 
are displaced, even using pseudo-psychological explanations to do so.  Amar points to the 
New York Times as a particularly consistent perpetrator of these gendered representations. 
According to Amar,  
[I]t was only natural for the Times, when revolution began in Tunisia in 
2011, to trace the revolt’s origins back to the frustrated masculinities of 
the two men they deemed to be the instigators of this new kind of uprising: 
Mark Zuckerberg of Facebook, who invented his social network 
supposedly because his girlfriend dumped him, and Mohamed Bouazizi, 
the self-immolated fruit-vendor and martyr…whose pride was gravely 
shamed when the policewoman would not let him “yank back his 
apples.”191  
 
The attribution of violence to this “racialized Middle Eastern maleness” obscures the 
political, economic, and social nuances of the situation and resembles the masking of 
goals with humanist causes discussed in the Introduction.  These orientalized 
masculinities are valuable tools, and it is their value that places them within a neoliberal 
orientalist framework. The following section will discuss how states benefit from and 
utilized these valuable oriental and gendered tropes.   	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How the West Benefits 
Paul Amar succinctly explains in “Middle East Masculinity Studies” how the state 
employs oriental representations of violent masculinities: 
[A]ccounts of masculine norms and socialization processes that generate 
domestic violence can be utilized to increase repressive interventions by 
the state in racialized and immigrant communities in ways that increase 
gendered violence and economic marginality. Studies of male youth self-
organization and militarization can feed the extension of gang injunction 
legislation, the mainstreaming of counter insurgency policing policies, and 
the re-segregation and re-racialization of social space…[These policies] 
never resolve root questions of gender and sexual justice.192 
Like the structural adjustment policies enforced by the IMF and World Bank, the policies 
Amar describes do little to deconstruct social issues’ roots, and instead expand 
government – or international powers’ – control over vulnerable populations.  Khaled 
Shaalan, writer for Jadaliyya, writes:   
The failure of Western media and pundits to both recognize and project 
the nuances of the current conflict in Egypt through their negligence of 
people’s agency in shaping the political outcomes is both pathetic and 
shameful. It is pathetic because it indicates the degree to which Western 
intellectual circles—especially those profiteering from Western 
policymaking bodies—remain willfully entrapped in an outdated and out-
of-touch Orientalist worldview of the region.193 
 
With the current state of affairs, Western powers – in both the public and private sectors 
– need not take responsibility for the extended and often-negative impact they continue to 
have on countries in the Global South.  Neoliberalism separates all social ills from their 
institutionalized roots. It isolates the symptoms of a systemic problem, addressing only 
what lies on the surface in a manner akin to treating a bullet wound with a Band-Aid.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  192	  Amar, “Middle East Masculinities.” 45-45.	  193	  Khaled Shaalan, “Why the Western Media Are Getting Egypt Wrong.” Jadaliyya, Arab Studies 
Institute, July 3, 2013. Web.	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And yet, its ineffectiveness at solving a problem is precisely what makes it an effective 
capitalist tool. For example, although the United States calls for peace in Egypt, it 
continues to benefit from the violence.  The United States sells an enormous amount of 
weaponry to the Egyptian military, and as was reported in Jadaliyya in 2011, the US 
government “grants the Egyptian army an annual 1.3 billion USD in aid through its 
Foreign Military Financing program.”194  The military is therefore both reliant on and 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 Said asserts that orientalism is not a conspiracy.195  I disagree.  Most participants 
in the neoliberal orientalist conspiracy are unwitting members, but this is because they 
choose to be.  The choice of the masses to remain benighted and benefit from their willful 
ignorance feeds the neoliberal orientalist machine.  Sally Quinn and John Kerry are not 
conscious conspirators in the oppression of others.  But this does not mean they are not 
culpable of permitting and even perpetuating this oppression.  And if they are, we all are.  
Similarly, General Sisi might not actively wish to oppress female Egyptian citizens.  But 
he participates in and advocates for systems that do.  Sisi, Quinn, and Kerry have in 
common their myopia and the narrow lenses through which they evaluate the world.      
 As long as this myopia and these narrow frames dominate mainstream opinion, s 
long as individuals are limited to specific roles based on gender, race, sexuality, and any 
other differences deemed socially divisive, revolutions will fail.  This has always been 
particularly apparent with regards to gender, as Julie Shayne iterates in The Revolution 
Question: 
[R]evolutionary movements are organized in one of two ways, “the 
‘woman-in-the-family’ or patriarchal model of revolution, and the 
‘women’s emancipation’ or modernizing model”…The woman-in-the-
family model of revolution tends to equate national liberation and 
discourse to patriarchal values, while, the contrasting women’s 
emancipation model postulates that the emancipation of women is a 
fundamental part of a socialist revolution. In the former, women are 
reduced to mothers of the revolution rather than actual revolutionaries, 
while in the latter women are often left with promises unmet.196 
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  Said, Orientalism, 345. 196	  Shayne, Revolution, 9.	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The SCAF and Muslim Brotherhood embody this “woman-in-the-family” patriarchal 
model.  Progressive neoliberals like Quinn and Kerry embody aspects of the “women’s 
emancipation” or “modernizing” model.  As was demonstrated in Chapter 2, the SCAF 
and the Brotherhood attempted to contain female participation in accordance with a 
patriarchal society.  As was demonstrated in Chapter 3, the neoliberal agenda advocates 
on the surface for female emancipation, but fails to follow through.  Neither approach 
addresses the systemic problem of gender inequality and consequently, neither approach 
successfully reconfigures a more equal social order.       
Just as wakil and gad’a must be substantiated with actions in order for an 
individual to earn these titles, political figures must act to substantiate their claims of 
concern for women’s rights to earn the label ascription of women’s rights advocates.  
Gad’a is available to men and women – despite being normatively associated with the 
former – as long as an individual behaves in accordance with its values.  Similarly, the 
role of women’s rights advocate is available to anyone – secular liberals and conservative 
Islamists alike – as long as they actively fight for women’s rights.  Smaller and less 
influential – at least for the moment – groups understand the comprehensive approach 
that must be taken for a revolution to truly revolt against the hegemonic social order.  
Nazra and El Nadeem insist upon this in every report they publish: 
[W]omen’s issues are, first and foremost, political issues in the broadest 
sense, which includes, in addition to political institutions, agents, and 
roles, the general social framework within which political actors operate, 
and that in turn, sets the boundaries of this framework with their actions.  
This perspective is based on the division of social roles on a class and 
gender basis. Political actors, both men and women, do not operate in a 
vacuum, but in the shadow of a patriarchal, classist social reality that both 
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limits and determines their political actions, and creates opportunities and 
risks for all actors, not only women.197   
I argue that individuals do not operate in a vacuum. Even if they are not themselves 
political actors, they exist, as we all do, “in the shadows” of these social systems that 
determine their actions. This is not restricted to the overtly political sphere.  As I argued 
in my analysis of Natasha Smith’s word choice, we are all influenced by dominant 
discourse.  I make no conclusive claim here, other than the necessity of reflection. I can 
only end with a question: What does it mean to claim an understanding of or allyship for 
feminist and anti-racist causes in an environmental context that is both revolutionary and 
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